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Reuters
5 hours ago
- Politics
- Reuters
Tunisia sentences ex-President Marzouki to 22 years in absentia
TUNIS, June 20 (Reuters) - A Tunisian court on Friday handed down a 22‑year prison sentence in absentia to former President Moncef Marzouki, a fierce critic of President Kais Saied, on charges of undermining state security, raising the opposition's fears of an escalating crackdown against critics. Marzouki, who was president from 2011 to 2014, accuses Saied of establishing an authoritarian regime after dismissing parliament and ruling by decree since he seized almost all powers in 2011. Saied defends his actions as necessary steps to stabilise Tunisia. This is the third ruling against Marzouki, after a court ruled last year to imprison him for eight years and four years before that in various other cases. Commenting on the ruling, Marzouki said from his exile in Paris: "I say to these judges: your rulings are invalid, and you are invalid ... you will be tried soon". "Democracy will return", he added. Earlier on Friday, another court sentenced Sahbi Atig, a senior official in Ennahda, the country's main opposition party, to 15 years in prison on charges of money laundering, his lawyer said. The 15-year sentence was shorter than some sentences handed down recently. In April, a court sentenced a string of opposition leaders, businessmen and lawyers to prison terms of up to 66 years, on conspiracy charges. Most of the leaders of political parties in Tunisia are in prison, including Abir Moussi, leader of the Free Constitutional Party, and Rached Ghannouchi, the head of Ennahda - two of Saied's most prominent opponents.
New Straits Times
2 days ago
- Entertainment
- New Straits Times
#SHOWBIZ: Azura Aziz relieved that eldest son is finally a Malaysian citizen
KUALA LUMPUR: Singer Azura Aziz is relieved and grateful that her eldest son, Seiful Islam Ali, 22, affectionately known as Bubu, has finally obtained Malaysian citizenship after a lengthy process. In a recent interview with Harian Metro, Azura revealed the numerous obstacles she and her Egyptian husband, Cheb Ali, faced when their three Egyptian-born sons moved with them to Malaysia in 2017. "These problems arose from our lack of knowledge regarding the law," she explained. "Initially, we frequently travelled between Malaysia and Egypt. Our first two sons, Bubu and Safiyurrahman Ali, or Totti, were both born in Egypt and automatically acquired Egyptian citizenship as their father is an Egyptian national." Azura added that they later decided to prolong their stay in Egypt so their children could continue their studies at Al-Azhar University. "It was during that time that our third son, Nusratuddin Ali, or Mimo, was born." However, political instability following the Arab Spring forced the family to return to Malaysia in 2017. "That's when our difficulties truly began," Azura recounted. "Every year, we had to apply for student passes for the boys. They weren't eligible for textbook loans and were discouraged from participating in school activities." Azura and Cheb applied for Malaysian citizenship for their sons in September 2018. "After Bubu completed his Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) examination, things became particularly challenging," she said. "The Immigration Department informed us he could only remain in Malaysia if he attended a private university, which we simply couldn't afford." Good news finally arrived in July 2024, when the family received a letter from the Home Ministry confirming that their sons' applications for citizenship had been approved. Totti, 20, received his MyKad in January, while Bubu, 21, first had to relinquish his Egyptian citizenship. Currently, Bubu and Totti are studying at the National Arts, Culture and Heritage Academy (Aswara), while Mimo is in Year Five of primary school. "Thank you to the government," Azura expressed.
Express Tribune
2 days ago
- Business
- Express Tribune
The unlivable city
Listen to article For yet another year, Karachi has been branded one of the world's least livable cities, ranking 170 out of 173 in the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2025 Global Liveability Index. With a dismal score of 42.7 on a 100-point scale, Karachi barely edged out Dhaka, Tripoli and Damascus to stay out of last place. It should be noted however that Dhaka has been at the centre of a political revolution that led to the overthrow of the Bangladeshi government and several protests, some of which turned violent. Tripoli has been ravaged by a civil war and repeated flare-ups since the Arab Spring began in 2011, while Damascus has just emerged from the brutality of the Syrian civil war. Karachi, on the other hand, has no civil war or uprising to blame. It just is that much of a mess. The city's woes are multifaceted, rooted in decades of neglect and misguided priorities. Karachi scored worst in "stability" and "infrastructure" — even worse than war zones where roads, highways and hospitals are being bombed — and it remains plagued by crime, terrorism and inadequate public services. In fact, a Forbes Adviser list last year placed Karachi as the second riskiest city for international tourists. An Asian Development Bank report also offered more context for Karachi's problems, drawing a direct link between grotesque income inequality and the city's major problems. While it is quite difficult to make things worse, Mayor Murtaza Wahab's defence was simultaneously lamentable as he criticised the survey for overlooking Karachi's "vibrancy" and "resilience." Other cities generally described as vibrant include Vienna and Damascus, which are polar opposites in almost every other measure. Beyond security, many of the problems holding Karachi back are unique to Pakistan, including the commercial emphasis on property speculation, which is more lucrative for businesses and politicians, rather than affordable housing developments, which are direly needed and still profitable.
Daily Maverick
4 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Why a jihadist takeover of a Sahelian capital is unlikely
Despite a recent surge in terrorist attacks, the region is more at risk of fragmentation than centralised jihadist rule. Insecurity has risen sharply in the Sahel in recent months. Between late May and early June, major attacks claimed by Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeted various locations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This resurgence underscores the two groups' adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies implemented by the Alliance of Sahel States' (AES) military-led governments. Consequently, some analysts are concerned about the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall under jihadist control – drawing parallels to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, there are critical contextual distinctions between the two scenarios. Unlike HTS, which has consistently pursued regime change to position itself as a political-religious alternative, JNIM and ISGS show no intent to seize power in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou. Rather, their strategies emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries where they mediate local conflicts, enforce norms and collect taxes. This underscores their comparatively limited operational capacity. JNIM and ISGS primarily operate in remote rural areas, using light weapons such as rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars. They also use motorcycles, improvised explosive devices and weaponised civilian drones. Although they have taken and temporarily controlled towns in the interior, such as Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to sustain a prolonged siege and occupation of a major city. Their strength lies in mobility and local knowledge rather than the capacity to occupy and govern territory for long periods. HTS, by contrast, developed a structured military force with centralised command and tactical units capable of coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The group had sustained access to sophisticated weaponry through well-organised transnational supply lines. The fall of Damascus represented the culmination of a broader regime-change dynamic set in motion by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to varying degrees, by some Western and Gulf countries. For a while, HTS capitalised on key cross-border corridors – particularly with Turkey – that enabled the steady influx of foreign fighters, medical aid, munitions and advanced weapons systems. No comparable geopolitical architecture exists in the Sahel. While weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed groups, there is no declared international effort aimed at toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Although AES leaders frequently accuse foreign actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the region, open-source data offers little evidence of this. Even Algeria, whose role in northern Mali has occasionally been ambivalent, has never sought to overthrow the government in Bamako. Another point of distinction is the internal dynamics of state militaries. The fall of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and ultimately Damascus, occurred within just two weeks. This was primarily due to the limited resistance by the Syrian Army – weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating living standards. In contrast, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian countries are increasing. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally resistant to jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Furthermore, having assumed political power, AES military leaders have entrenched their authority within the state apparatus, bolstering their responsibility and accountability. Also, the rise of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian population and economic collapse, further aggravated by international sanctions. Disillusioned by Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime, many Syrians viewed HTS as either a lesser evil or, in some cases, a more favourable alternative. The Sahel situation is starkly different. Although hardline Islamist ideologies have found some traction in urban centres, public sentiment in the capital cities remains hostile towards jihadists who are perceived as instigators of violence, instability and national suffering. For now, these factors together render the capture and sustained control of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces improbable. JNIM and ISGS are likely to restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation tactics. As history shows, however, this does not make these cities immune to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was triggered by military setbacks in the north. Similarly, Burkina Faso's January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny prompted by escalating casualties among security forces. Considering the AES countries' protracted military transitions and constrained political environments, further upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of security forces cannot be ruled out. This could have unpredictable consequences for the Sahel and west Africa at large. To avoid this, AES governments must acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised approach to terrorism. While increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures haven't incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world's epicentre for terrorism for the second consecutive year, accounting for half of all global casualties. The youthful appearance of the assailants in the foiled 2 June Timbuktu attack should be a wake-up call to AES strategists. It reflects a generation of children deprived of schooling due to chronic insecurity, and whose families lack access to income, justice and essential social services. These factors are potent drivers of recruitment into armed groups – and cannot be solved through military means alone. AES governments need a coherent, region-wide counterterrorism strategy that goes beyond military interventions. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin's disengagement and reintegration programmes, Mauritania's religious dialogue initiatives, and Algeria's non-kinetic approach. Equally important is the need to engage with communities stigmatised by counterterrorism operations, fostering trust and reducing the risk of recruitment. Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Economic Community of West African States could bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capacity to reduce the threat posed by armed groups. Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel could descend into prolonged fragmentation, with profound consequences for west Africa's stability. DM
News18
5 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Saudi Arabia Executes Journalist After 7 Years In Prison Over Posts Against Royal Family
Last Updated: Al-Jasser was detained following a raid on his residence in 2018, during which authorities confiscated his electronic devices including phones and computer. Saudi Arabia has executed prominent journalist Turki Al-Jasser, who was arrested in 2018 and later convicted on charges of terrorism and treason. The official Saudi Press Agency confirmed that the execution took place on Saturday after the kingdom's highest court upheld the death sentence. However, activist groups maintain that the charges against him were trumped up. Al-Jasser was detained following a raid on his residence in 2018, during which authorities confiscated his electronic devices including phones and computer. It was not clear where his trial took place or how long it lasted. According to the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, Saudi authorities maintained that Al-Jasser was behind a social media account on X, formerly Twitter, that levied corruption allegations against Saudi royals. Al-Jasser was also said to have posted several controversial tweets about militants and militant groups. Al-Jasser ran a personal blog from 2013 to 2015 and was well-known for his articles on the Arab Spring movements that shook the Middle East in 2011, women's rights and corruption. Activist groups have condemned the execution, insisting the charges were fabricated to silence dissent. CPJ's program director Carlos Martínez de la Serna condemned the execution and said the lack of accountability in the wake of the killing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in 2018 allows for continued persecution of journalists in the kingdom. A Saudi assassination team killed Khashoggi at the consulate in Istanbul. The US intelligence community concluded that the Saudi crown prince ordered the operation but the kingdom insists the prince was not involved in the killing. Saudi Arabia has drawn criticism from human rights groups for its numbers and also methods of capital punishment, including beheadings and mass executions. In 2024, executions in Saudi Arabia rose to 330, according to activists and human rights groups, as the kingdom continues to tightly clamp down on dissent. Last month, a British Bank of America analyst was sentenced to a decade in prison in Saudi Arabia, apparently over a since-deleted social media post, according to his lawyer. In 2021, a dual Saudi American national, Saad Almadi, was sentenced to more than 19 years in prison on terrorism-related charges stemming from tweets he had posted while living in the United States. He was released in 2023 but has been banned from leaving the kingdom. (With inputs from agencies) First Published: June 16, 2025, 21:44 IST
