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First Post
3 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
Why Iran's Fordow nuclear site that Israel wants to hit may be a big dilemma for Trump
As tensions rise between the US, Israel, and Iran, the GBU-57's real-world capability raises hard questions about whether Fordow is truly vulnerable read more Rescuers work at the site of a damaged building, in the aftermath of Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Reuters While many people imagine a quick, clean military strike — like dropping one powerful bomb to destroy Iran's Fordow nuclear facility — the real situation is much more complicated. The idea of using the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) to sounds like an easy fix, but in reality, it's full of risks, difficult decisions and serious political consequences. As Richard Nephew noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, even if a strike on Fordow worked, it would only be one part of the solution. It wouldn't be enough on its own to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Strategic significance of Fordow Fordow's relevance within Iran's nuclear architecture stems not just from its capability but from its resilience. Tucked beneath nearly 90 metres of mountainous rock near Qom, the facility houses thousands of centrifuges, including advanced IR-6s, capable of enriching uranium to weapons-grade purity within days. Its clandestine construction, revealed by US intelligence in 2009, and subsequent reactivation after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, demonstrates Iran's intent to maintain it as a strategic hedge. Nephew remarked that its very existence serves 'as a hedge and secure place' for clandestine weapons support. Fordow's protective depth and redundancy make it not merely a target but a symbol of Iran's nuclear endurance. The MOP: Tactical giant, strategic gamble The GBU-57A/B MOP represents the apex of US conventional bunker-busting capability. As described by the Air and Space Forces Magazine, it is a 30,000-pound bomb designed to burrow through over 60 metres of reinforced concrete or hard rock. This capability positions the MOP as a singular option for targeting hardened sites like Fordow. However, operational deployment remains limited; despite years of development since the early 2000s and several strategic deployments, no combat use of the MOP has ever been confirmed. The logistical requirements for deploying the MOP are severe. Only B-2 Spirit stealth bombers can carry it—each capable of delivering just two such munitions per sortie. These bombers must penetrate heavily defended Iranian airspace, likely relying on electronic warfare and support from refuelling and escort assets. Recent reports confirm the deployment of B-2s to Diego Garcia, with hints of operational readiness but no evidence of MOP usage in current or past campaigns in Yemen, Gaza or Syria. Operational uncertainties: A weapon without precedent Despite its engineering marvel, using the MOP against Fordow is an untested hypothesis. The exact depth and configuration of the facility remain classified, leaving open the possibility that even a successful detonation might not neutralise Iran's centrifuge operations. The use of a smart fuse with void-detection technology allows for timing detonation at optimal depth, yet as Nephew noted, damage assessment post-strike would be difficult—especially if Iran preemptively relocates sensitive equipment within the facility. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Fordow's compartmentalisation could mitigate the bomb's impact and any mission failing to destroy all centrifuge halls would leave Iran with a viable breakout capability. Moreover, the necessity of precise, real-time intelligence is paramount, given the potential for Iran to conceal, disperse or rapidly reinforce nuclear assets. Geopolitical risk: Striking Fordow is not just military The political ramifications of striking Fordow, particularly with the GBU-57, are manifold. A direct US military strike on Iranian soil would almost certainly provoke retaliatory actions—not only from Tehran but potentially from its network of regional proxies. Gulf states, Israel and US assets across West Asia could become targets in a broader escalation spiral. Internationally, such a move risks undermining fragile alliances and diplomacy. As the JCPOA showed, Iran's nuclear progress can be paused with negotiation. Yet, the Trump administration's prior exit from the deal—and subsequent hardline posture—illustrates a volatile political climate. Nephew warned that 'a diplomatic strategy…contained the threat in 2015.' With the current Israeli military actions and Washington's fluctuating commitment to diplomacy, a unilateral US strike may fracture NATO cohesion and alienate European allies advocating restraint. Political calculus: Trump, optics and the war decision The domestic political calculus in Washington—particularly under Trump's leadership—intertwines with strategic deliberations. Trump's abrupt exit from the June 2025 G7 summit, citing events 'bigger than a ceasefire,' has intensified speculation about impending military action. His rhetoric has leaned toward sabre-rattling with claims of control over Iranian airspace and veiled threats towards Iranian leadership. These remarks align with hawkish voices in his party, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who advocate for the MOP's use as a means of crippling Iran's nuclear infrastructure. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD However, this approach risks alienating isolationist factions within his base and provoking bipartisan concern in Congress. Proposals to limit presidential authority in launching unapproved military campaigns reflect historical anxieties that strategic strikes may be misused for domestic political gain. Illusion of finality Even if the MOP were to destroy Fordow completely, the assumption that this would eliminate Iran's nuclear threat is overly optimistic. As Nephew emphasised, Fordow is not the only path to a bomb. Iran has dispersed its nuclear infrastructure, possibly building new, hidden sites and maintaining a reserve of centrifuges ready for rapid deployment. In fact, Tehran recently hinted at the unveiling of another 'invulnerable' enrichment facility, following the IAEA's findings of treaty noncompliance. Thus, the destruction of Fordow could represent a tactical victory but a strategic pause at best. Any delay could still allow Iran to resume its programme through alternate channels, particularly if the attack undermines future diplomacy or collapses monitoring agreements with the IAEA. Historical precedents and strategic lessons Past examples offer sobering lessons. In post-Gulf War Iraq, containment and inspections eventually faltered, despite extensive military pressure and diplomatic mechanisms. Similarly, Israel's past sabotage of Iran's Natanz plant—targeting its above-ground infrastructure—slowed progress temporarily but failed to halt the overall trajectory of the program. The potential use of the MOP, therefore, must be viewed through this historical lens. It is not merely an act of destruction, but a signal: one that could rally Iran's domestic support, justify nuclear acceleration and fracture international consensus. Strategy must precede firepower The notion that the GBU-57A/B MOP represents a silver bullet against Iran's nuclear ambitions is strategically seductive but fundamentally needs serious scrutiny. Fordow's destruction, while important, cannot guarantee the elimination of Iran's breakout capability. Worse still, such a strike risks severe geopolitical backlash, undermining the very stability it purports to protect. Nephew's analysis frames this reality succinctly. The destruction of Fordow is a 'necessary—but not sufficient' condition. Without a broader strategy — one that combines coercion with credible diplomacy — the use of the MOP may prove not only insufficient but counterproductive. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD As tensions escalate, decision-makers must weigh the gravity of initiating a strike with such a singular and potent weapon — one that has never been used in combat — not as an act of cinematic heroism but of sober, calculated statecraft.
Yahoo
06-03-2025
- General
- Yahoo
Air Force aircraft readiness plunges to new low, alarming chief
AURORA, Colo. — Barely more than six in 10 aircraft in the Air Force's fleet were able to carry out their missions on an average day in fiscal 2024, according to a Defense News analysis. The fleet-wide mission capable rate of 62% is the lowest in recent memory. It comes as the Air Force's arsenal of more than 5,000 planes is aging and the service finds it increasingly difficult to keep some in the air. The Air Force provided statistics on how many of each kind of aircraft it had in 2024, as well as the percentage of time each aircraft was ready to carry out its mission. Those stats were first reported by Air and Space Forces Magazine. To come up with a fleet-wide mission-capable rate, Defense News calculated a weighted average of all airframes. Using a weighted average places more emphasis on airframes that the service has more of — such as the C-17 Globemaster, F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter — and less emphasis on rarer airframes. With the Air Force's fleet at 5,025 — the smallest in the service's 78-year history — a 62% mission-capable rate equates to roughly 1,900 planes being out of commission at any given time. Heather Penney, a former F-16 pilot and senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said the figures are concerning, and suggest the situation is likely getting even worse this year. 'Readiness is often a lagging indicator,' Penney said. 'And those aren't even today's MC rates,' which she predicted will be even worse when 2025 is done. The Air Force, along with other services, has for years struggled to pull up its mission-capable rates. President Donald Trump's first defense secretary, Jim Mattis, in 2018 set an ambitious goal of 80% readiness for F-16s, F-22s and F-35s — which went unmet. And judging by a similar metric — aircraft availability — the true state of the fleet may even be worse. According to a 2019 paper by analysts at the Air Force Institute of Technology and Air Force Materiel Command, mission-capable rates do not consider aircraft that are awaiting depot maintenance or are otherwise not possessed at the unit level. Those analysts said aircraft availability rates are a truer measure of how the Air Force's planes are doing. In his Monday keynote address to the Air and Space Force Association's AFA Warfare Symposium in Aurora, Colorado, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin used that aircraft availability statistic to sound perhaps the strongest alarm yet about the state of the service's fleet. Allvin displayed a chart showing the increasing trouble facing the Air Force's planes. The chart tracked a steady growth of the average aircraft age in the fleet — from about 17 in 1994 to nearly 32 in 2024 — while aircraft availability plummeted from 73% to 54%. Allvin praised the service's maintainers, who work long hours in tough conditions to keep their planes flying. 'You wouldn't know this on the front lines,' Allvin said of the growing availability problems, 'because of the miracles that are going on from our maintainers and those who are sustaining [airplanes]. … We're eating into whatever margin we had.' Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have proclaimed a focus on improving the military's 'lethality,' firing top brass they perceive to be standing in the way. Fresh budget cuts to the Defense Department have had the services clamoring to be spared from measures that would bring down readiness rates further. In this environment, Penney said, poor aircraft readiness rates make top Air Force leaders vulnerable. Even more worrying to Penney is that there's no simple way to turn the situation around. 'It's complex, because it's spares, maintenance manpower, maintenance experience levels [and] depots, which are so behind right now,' Penney said. The Air Force's current predicament, as Penney sees it, is largely due to the lack of enough major aircraft modernizations. Much of the Air Force's fleet was around during the Cold War, and there are several air frames — such as the B-52 Stratofortress, C-5 Galaxy and KC-135 Stratotanker — that were around during the Vietnam War. Air Force officials commonly refer to such planes as 'tired iron,' and quip that they 'find new and interesting ways to break.' Without enough modernizations to replace those planes with new airframes, the service is forced to sustain them longer and longer, trying to scrounge up spare parts to fix them. In the case of the Air Force's 76 B-52Hs, which have been flying since the early 1960s, some companies that originally made spare parts are no longer in business. This often forces the service to find new sources for those parts, custom make the parts itself, or 'cannibalize' parts from other Stratofortresses that are even more broken. The situation results in a slow and steady decline in the B-52′s availability. In 2021, the bomber had a 59% mission-capable rate, but that has now slid to 54%. The overall numbers show a swift decline in aircraft readiness over the last few years, driven by some of the service's most crucial airframes, such as the F-35A. The Air Force's overall mission-capable rate was nearly 78% in 2012, but steadily slid as the decade progressed to a then-low of slightly below 70% in 2018. Two years later, that fleet-wide figure had risen to 72.7%, and then dropped to 71.5% in 2021. The Lockheed Martin-made F-35A — the cornerstone of the service's fighter fleet and one of the most expensive military programs in history — has been plagued with reliability and availability issues. In 2021, the fighter was available nearly 69% of the time, according to the Air Force. But the F-35A's mission capable rates have since plunged, and the jet was ready 51.5% of the time in 2024. The Joint Strike Fighter's lagging availability has become such a problem that its program executive officer, Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt, in 2023 announced a 'war on readiness' that seeks to improve how often the F-35 can fly. The Government Accountability Office in 2023 released a report on the entire F-35 fleet's maintenance challenges, which said services lacked spare parts and technical data needed to repair the fighters. Maintainers were also not properly trained, GAO said, and an effort to expand repair depots was falling behind. Chauncey McIntosh, a Lockheed vice president and general manager of the company's F-35 program, said in an interview at AFA that he is focused on improving the jet's mission readiness, and is working with the F-35 Joint Program Office to do so. Most parts in the F-35 are lasting longer than expected, McIntosh said, and the company is focused on improving those parts that are less reliable, which the program refers to as 'degraders.' 'We've been able to drive down those top degraders, and there's only really a few left that we're focused on now,' McIntosh said. The next major issue to tackle, he said, will be to ensure that repair depots have all the spare parts they need to fix F-35s. 'As we get the right parts, and get the right [funding from Congress for them], then we'll be able to go procure those parts, put those parts on the shelf,' McIntosh said. 'This is a growing fleet, so we need to make sure that the [spare parts inventory] keeps up with the fleet size — for not only the U.S., but all of our international partners.' Other key airframes that dropped precipitously in recent years include the A-10 Warthog, the CV-22 Osprey, the F-16 fighter, the KC-46 Pegasus tanker and the T-38C Talon jet trainer. Mission-capable rates for the Air Force's Ospreys were at about 51% in 2021, but by 2023 plunged to 46% and then to 30% in 2024. The Osprey, which is also flown by the Navy and Marine Corps, has been plagued in recent years by faulty components, clutch problems and fatal crashes that led to multiple groundings. The A-10 Warthog's readiness rate slid from 72% in 2021 to 67% in 2023 and 2024. The F-16C fell from almost 72% in 2021 down to 64% in 2024; while the two-seater variant, the F-16D, dropped even more precipitously during that time, from 69% to 59%. The KC-46′s mission capable rates dropped from 71% in 2021 to 61% in 2024. The T-38C's availability also declined from 63% in 2021 to 55% in 2024. The Air Force is buying new T-7A Red Hawk trainers from Boeing to replace the nearly 60-year-old T-38. But the T-7 has repeatedly fallen behind schedule, which will require the Air Force to keep flying — and maintaining — T-38s years longer than originally expected. The lack of enough mission-capable aircraft has forced the Air Force to make tough choices on how to use its working planes. The service has for years prioritized its ability to carry out operational missions over other missions like training. This means it front-loads its working aircraft to units overseas or that otherwise carry out operations, but stateside units are more likely to have shortages of working aircraft. U.S. Air Forces Central Command, which for decades has flown aircraft such as the A-10, F-15, F-16 and F-35 in the Middle East to project American airpower, is one example of a command that is prioritized in such a way. But even getting to the head of the line for things like spare parts doesn't automatically solve all of AFCENT's problems, commander Lt. Gen. Derek France told reporters at AFA. Sometimes logistical hurdles mean spare parts still take a while to get to the deployed jets that need them, he said. And environmental factors such as heat and sand — particularly in summertime — can wear on the aircraft, France said. And most of all, he said, AFCENT's planes are growing old, just like the rest of the service's aircraft. 'The fact of the matter is, we've got an aging fleet,' France said. 'Our AFCENT airmen do heroic work in keeping them in the air. The things that I have seen, with our airmen, to be able to put together the parts, and get after the things they need to, has been impressive in our [area of responsibility], for sure.' France could not quantify readiness rates for AFCENT planes, but said 'our airmen meet mission when they need to.' A critical part of being AFCENT commander, he said, is forecasting when his units will need to surge aircraft and put large numbers of jets in the air, and when they can pull back. Those 'pull back' phases give maintainers time and space to work more intensely on AFCENT's planes and 'get our jets healthy again,' France said. In his speech at AFA, Allvin stressed how important it is for the Air Force to fix this problem once and for all. 'Our Air Force continues to be the most dominant on the planet,' Allvin said. 'I don't want to be here next year, or have the next chief, say we're no longer [dominant]. So we've got to work on this.'
