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Asia Times
10-06-2025
- Science
- Asia Times
China cracks a code on invisible battlefield surveillance
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese radar scientists have demonstrated a breakthrough system enabling aircraft to detect moving ground targets with high clarity while remaining completely radio-silent. Led by Li Zhongyu of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, the team used two Cessna 208 planes in formation, with one actively transmitting radar signals and the other passively receiving echoes, to test their 'space-time decoupling two-channel clutter cancellation method.' As reported in the Journal of Radars, the test tracked three vehicles across terrain previously inaccessible to traditional radar due to clutter, range migration and Doppler noise. Through advanced motion correction, spectrum compression and a novel matrix-based clutter suppression technique, the system isolated targets with over 20 decibels more clarity than current technologies. The passive aircraft never transmitted signals, making it nearly impossible to detect or jam, ideal for low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) missions, according to the Journal of Radars report. Instead of relying on artificial intelligence, the method utilizes efficient mathematical models specifically designed for real-world applications. The development could allow Chinese aircraft and missiles to silently scan battlefields, oceans or skies, identifying mobile threats without alerting adversaries. Li called the system a world first, positioning China at the cutting edge of stealth radar capabilities amid growing global electronic warfare competition. Explaining the complementary nature of passive and active radars, Eric Hundman mentions in a March 2025 report for the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) that passive radars can often detect stealth aircraft, as they're hard for anti-radiation weapons to target because they emit no signals. However, Hundman says the applications of passive radar remain relatively limited due to its reliance on unpredictable external signals, narrow usable frequencies and relatively unsophisticated processing algorithms. As for active radars, Hundman says they offer high-resolution, multi-function capabilities, combining stealth detection, surveillance, tracking and fire control in increasingly mobile and networked platforms. However, he points out that since active radars emit signals, they are vulnerable to detection by passive sensors and anti-radiation missiles. In view of each system's limitations, Hundman states that Chinese researchers are working to complement active radars with passive systems and pursue network integration, aiming to fuse data across platforms for a more resilient and comprehensive radar network capable of withstanding electronic and kinetic threats. Discussing the potential operational application of the technology, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) states that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to make progress in the development and integration of unmanned systems, including drone swarm tactics and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) concepts. According to the report, these efforts include employing drones for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as electronic warfare, decoys and potentially precision strike missions in coordination with stealth aircraft. In an April 2025 report for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Travis Sharp highlights the strategic pairing of manned stealth fighters and collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs), emphasizing their complementary roles in air dominance. Sharp says CCAs, acting as loyal wingmen, would use active radar to detect and track enemy aircraft, transmitting targeting data to stealth fighters that remain electronically silent to avoid detection. He notes that this setup enhances survivability while extending the fighter's engagement range, allowing long-range missile strikes before the enemy is aware. Sharp adds that CCAs can also jam enemy radars, further complicating adversary targeting efforts. He points out that such tactics are key to improving loss-exchange ratios in potential conflicts, including in the Taiwan Strait between the US and China. The advent of China's purportedly sixth-generation fighters adds impetus to the development of such technology. Malcolm Davis mentions in an SCMP article this month that China's J-36, which appears to be optimized for air-to-air combat with very long-range missiles, could achieve advanced stealth and teaming with collaborative combat aircraft (CCA). Further, Timothy Heath mentions in the same article that sixth-generation fighters are unlikely to be involved in maneuvering dogfights but instead focus on command and control, enabling unmanned aircraft to conduct strikes against air, marine and ground targets. Ditching manned fighters altogether, the SCMP reported in May 2025 that China's Jiu Tan drone carrier, a super-high-altitude, long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), could carry up to 100 kamikaze drones or six tons of ammunition with a maximum range of 7,000 kilometers and an altitude of 15,000 meters. SCMP notes that, if deployed, the Jiu Tan could contribute to the PLA's swarming capabilities, wherein large groups of drones are released to overwhelm an adversary's defenses. Stacie Pettyjohn and other writers mention in a June 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that China could utilize its diverse drone fleet, ranging from kamikaze to reconnaissance and loyal wingman-type systems, to saturate air defenses, rapidly close kill chains, and complicate Taiwan and US countermeasures in a conflict over the island. Pettyjohn and others say that China holds an initial advantage due to its large, inexpensive and varied drone arsenal, which could be used to locate and strike US and Taiwanese forces with speed and scale. They also warn that drone mass and rapid adaptation, not just innovation, is critical, citing Ukraine as a cautionary example, with China's production capacity giving it a dangerous edge in the opening phases of a Taiwan war. As for the US's capability to counter drone swarms, Wilson Beaver and Ka'Von Johnson mention in a Heritage Foundation report this month that the US faces growing challenges in countering drone swarms due to fragmented capabilities, underdeveloped training and an overreliance on costly systems. Beaver and Johnson say that while kinetic interceptors and electronic warfare tools offer layered defenses, gaps persist in small-drone detection, real-time threat identification and swarm neutralization. They point out that directed-energy weapons, such as lasers and high-powered microwaves (HPMs), remain impractical due to issues with range, power and target discrimination. In addition, they say most counter-drone systems are not widely fielded, few troops are trained to operate them and base commanders often lack the authority to engage drones, compounding vulnerabilities. While the US races to patch gaps in drone defenses, China is methodically assembling a sensor-strike network designed to operate silently, resiliently and at scale.
Asia Times
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
US Navy wants sea-launched nuke missiles to hold China at bay
Amid rising nuclear tensions with China, the US Navy is advancing its most consequential theater nuclear weapon in decades: the sea-launched, low-yield cruise missile. In a statement delivered this month before the US House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe mentioned that the US Navy is set to make a milestone decision in Fiscal Year 2026 on the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, Nuclear (SLCM-N), aiming for delivery by 2034. According to Wolfe's statement, the decision marks a pivotal step in developing a survivable, flexible nuclear strike option to address regional deterrence gaps, particularly amid growing adversarial capabilities. In his statement, he states that the SLCM-N program has already established a dedicated office and is conducting extensive technical, engineering and integration assessments across missile, fire control, warhead and submarine systems. However, the statement notes key challenges, such as adapting a nuclear warhead to a conventionally designed cruise missile and ensuring compatibility with Virginia-class submarines, while maintaining nuclear surety and minimizing operational disruptions. Despite those challenges, the statement says infrastructure development at Strategic Weapons Facilities is underway to support storage and handling without affecting existing Trident programs. It stresses that continued funding and rapid workforce scaling are deemed critical to meeting the 2034 initial operational capability goal. The statement notes that the milestone decision in FY26 will formally initiate acquisition and solidify program execution strategy, setting the stage for one of the US Navy's most consequential nuclear modernization efforts in decades amid rising strategic competition and the need for credible deployable deterrent options in the region. Contextualizing the impetus behind the revamped SLCM-N program, the US Department of Defense (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) states that China possesses 600 operational nuclear warheads and will have over 1,000 by 2030. The report also says China is building a nuclear triad alongside developing advanced delivery systems such as fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and low-yield warheads for regional deterrence and proportionate response. The report points out that despite China's no-first-use (NFU) policy, its actions indicate otherwise, saying that it might resort to nuclear weapons use if conventional attacks threaten its nuclear infrastructure or the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) regime survival, particularly in a Taiwan contingency. It adds that the integration of conventional and nuclear capabilities, coupled with blurred thresholds for use, could complicate crisis management and escalation control. In line with those developments, the 2023 US Strategic Posture Report states that additional US theater nuclear capabilities are needed in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to deter Russia and China, respectively. It notes that such capabilities should be deployable, survivable and offer variable yield options. It also adds that the US president must have a range of militarily effective nuclear response options to deter or counter limited nuclear use in theater conflicts, highlighting concerns that US deterrence lacks credibility in limited nuclear escalation scenarios where strategic weapons appear disproportionate. Delving into the SLCM-N's capabilities, John Harvey and Rob Soofer mention in a November 2022 Atlantic Council report that it addresses a US capability gap in response to the threat of limited nuclear employment. It also states that China has more options at the regional level, while US nuclear capabilities are not necessarily prompt, may lack survivability and may be vulnerable to adversary defenses. Highlighting the vulnerability of the US air-based nuclear arsenal in the Pacific, Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that in a US-China war over Taiwan, most US aircraft losses would happen on the ground, as most US air bases in the Pacific lack substantial hardening against China's long-range strike capabilities, making them vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. Regarding the US sea-based nuclear arsenal, Thomas Mahnken and Bryan Clark highlight in a June 2020 article for The Strategist that if an alert nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) cannot launch its missiles, fails to communicate with commanders ashore or gets destroyed, all of its missiles become unavailable simultaneously. Mahnken and Clark stress that if only one SSBN is on patrol, its loss could mean the loss of an entire leg of a nuclear triad. In contrast to those vulnerabilities, a February 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that deploying the SLCM-N aboard surface vessels or nuclear attack submarines (SSN) provides greater availability and regional presence, while being forward-deployed, survivable against pre-emptive attack and capable of penetrating air and missile defenses. Despite the SLCM-N's advantages, David Kearn argues in a January 2025 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that the weapon is redundant, considering the US already has other low-yield nuclear options such as the Long-Range Standoff Missile (LRSO), the B61-12 gravity bomb and a low-yield variant of the Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Kearn adds that the high costs of the SLCM-N program – price-tagged at US$10 billion, but likely even more than that – could draw away funds, infrastructure and workforce from other programs, such as upgrading the Trident II D-5 SLBM and the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPM) hypersonic weapon, at a critical time. He points out that the US industrial base is already struggling to produce conventional and nuclear munitions, with US nuclear infrastructure belatedly starting to reverse decades of neglect and underinvestment. Given the arguments for and against the SLCM-N, particularly in the context of a possible US-China war over Taiwan, there is clear incentive to keep such a conflict below the nuclear threshold. In a November 2024 RAND report, Edward Geist and other writers mention that to avoid nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict scenario, the US must pursue a strategy rooted in restraint, calibrated force employment and real-time adaptability. Geist and others stress that objectives must be limited to denying a Chinese invasion, not threatening regime survival or China's nuclear deterrent, both of which could provoke a first strike. They point out that long-range strikes, while operationally essential, must be designed with escalation sensitivity, eschewing ambiguous tactics that could be misread as nuclear preemption. Crucially, Geist and others emphasize that the US must anticipate Chinese misperceptions, recognizing that red lines are fluid and often opaque, highlighting that intelligence updates, clear signaling, and robust crisis communication channels are essential to prevent miscalculation or accidental escalation. They also call for strategic humility – acknowledging that even minor tactical decisions may cascade into catastrophic outcomes, stressing that victory without nuclear disaster hinges not on raw power but on disciplined, perception-sensitive warfighting.
