Tribesmen block main road linking Shabwa with Aden in Abyan
ABYAN, May 07 (YPA) – Armed tribesmen blocked the main road linking Aden and Shabwa in Maudiyah district, east of Abyan governorate, in response to the kidnapping of two members of the Al Saleh tribe by Emirati factions.
The Al Saleh tribe in Maudiyah sent dozens of its armed members yesterday, to block the main road in the Amdhraa area, west of the district, in protest against the kidnapping of two of its recruits in the Giants Brigades by Emirati factions in the center of Ataq, the center of Shabwa.
Sheikhs and dignitaries of the Al Saleh tribe demanded the release of their recruits, who were later transferred to a secret prison in Marra camp, west of Ataq.
Transitional Council factions in Abyan headed to the Amdhraa area of Maudiyah to end the road blockade amid tensions in the region.
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