US intelligence needs overhaul to stop Beijing forcibly taking Taiwan: report
Published: 5:05pm, 14 Feb 2025 A Washington-based think tank has proposed a major overhaul of the US Intelligence Community's early-warning capabilities to deter the People's Liberation Army from forcibly taking Taiwan.
The proposal written by Scott Berrier, a retired US Army lieutenant-general, and published on Thursday by the Atlantic Council, advocates for a real-time, integrated intelligence system that spans all domains – space, cyber, air, sea and land.
'The side that sees first decides first, and the one that acts first will have the advantage,' Berrier asserts in the brief, emphasising the need for speed and integration in modern warfare. The proposal suggests a fundamental shift in how intelligence is collected, analysed and shared. It urged the 18 independent agencies within the community – which includes the intelligence arms of each branch of the US military as well as bodies such as the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency , Treasury and Department of Energy – to 'overcome silos that hinder national security'.
02:47
Trump won't let Europe turn Uncle Sam into 'Uncle Sucker', US defence chief says Trump won't let Europe turn Uncle Sam into 'Uncle Sucker', US defence chief says Berrier, who is a senior fellow at the think tank's Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, highlights the critical need for a unified, agile approach to intelligence that uses advanced technologies such as AI to enable faster, more accurate decision making.
This was crucial because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) used cyber power rather than traditional firepower to pressure Taiwan, the report said.
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Asia Times
3 hours ago
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This is due to Iran's long-standing 'Look East' policy and the impact its instability could have on the region and the global economy. However, at the current stage, many analysts believe both are unlikely to get involved directly. Moscow stayed on the sidelines when Assad's regime collapsed in Syria, one of Russia's closest allies in the region. Not only is it focused on its war in Ukraine, Russia also wouldn't want to endanger improving ties with the Trump administration. China has offered Iran strong rhetorical support, but history suggests it has little interest in getting directly involved in Middle Eastern conflicts. Ali Mamouri is research fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Asia Times
4 hours ago
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Trump's unpredictable approach to Iran could seriously backfire
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While Trump has specified a possible attack on the infamous underground nuclear facility at Fordow, the rest of the plan is extremely hazy. Trump said he wants 'better than a ceasefire.' But what does that mean? Just Fordow? Boots on the ground? Regime change? His ambiguity creates problems for deterrence because if your adversary doesn't know what the outcomes of their actions will be, they can't formulate a response or will think you just aren't serious. But current US foreign policy on Iran is more than bad deterrence. Trump's vague rhetoric and his refusal to commit reflects his long-standing strategy of being unreliable when it comes to foreign policy. Trump's prevarication has all the hallmarks of his unpredictability doctrine – which states that you should never let anyone know what you will do. The doctrine is also about uncertainty. The idea being that you unnerve your opponents by making them unsure, allowing you to take the advantage while they have no idea what to do themselves. Trump's rhetoric on Iran reflects that unpredictability doctrine. Trump actively said of his future action: 'I mean, nobody knows what I'm going to do.' This would not be the first time he has used unpredictability in relation to Iran. In 2018, Trump withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This agreement – signed by the US, France, Germany, the UK, China, Russia and the EU – was designed to limit Iran's nuclear activity in return for sanctions relief. The US withdrawal was seen as disruptive and creating unnecessary uncertainty, not just for Iran but also US allies. Being unpredictable is a dangerous way of doing foreign policy. Stable international politics depends on knowing what everyone else will do. You can't do that with Trump. The downsides of unpredictability will be even worse in a conflict. In the case of Iran, adding even more uncertainty to a fragile situation will only add fuel to what is already a massive fire. Trump's refusal to specify exactly what the US response would be is more proverbial petrol. The insinuation that this could escalate to regime change may be true or not (or just unpredictable bluster). It's also the case that only 14% of Americans support military intervention and so a more aggressive policy may not be realistic. But if Iran is led to think that Trump is directly threatening their state, this could encourage them to hunker down as opposed to changing their nuclear policy – risking greater military action on both sides. Donald Trump is being unclear about whether the US is going to bomb Iran. Even just the implicit threat of US military intervention will damage what little relations there are between America and Iran. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has said: 'Any US military intervention will undoubtedly cause irreparable damage.' Unpredictability then undermines any diplomatic negotiations or solution to the crisis. Trump is also risking his foreign policy relations beyond Iran. While preventing a new member of the nuclear club is a laudable aim, any US attack on a state over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will lie in the difficult shadow of the 'war on terror', the US-led military campaign launched after 9/11. With the International Atomic Energy Agency questioning Iran's capacity to build a nuclear bomb, the US's legacy of intervention over the WMD in Iraq that never were still looms large. Trump will need to be fully transparent and clear if any action over nuclear arms is going to be seen as legitimate. Unpredictability does not allow for that. Trump's fellow state leaders are going to feel disrupted by yet another example of unpredictability. Even if they support curbing Iran, they may find it difficult to back someone they simply can't depend on. And if they feel cautious about the Iran situation because they can't rely on Trump, Trump needs to start asking whether he can rely on them for support in whatever his next move is. Michelle Bentley is professor of international relations, Royal Holloway University of London This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
