N. Korea denounces US for deploying B-1B strategic bombers to Japan

North Korea on Friday denounced the United States for deploying B-1B strategic bombers to Japan, arguing that such deployment would pose a threat to security in the region.
The North's state-run Korean Central News Agency published the criticism in an article, accusing Washington of stationing its bomber in Japan for a long-term period and escalating tensions in the region to a record high by using Japan and South Korea as outposts.
On April 15, a US bomber task force, comprising B-1B Lancer aircraft, airmen and support equipment from the US Air Force's 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, arrived at Misawa Air Base, Japan, to reinforce regional stability in the Indo-Pacific, according to the Indo-Pacific Command. It marks the first time a US Air Force bomber task force has been deployed to Japan.
The US has also deployed a B-1B bomber to South Korea three times so far this year, including during a South Korea-US exercise in mid-April.
The B-1B Lancer is one of the three strategic US bombers, with the capacity to fly 12,000 kilometers non-stop at supersonic speeds and carry up to 57 tons of weapons.
The KCNA accused the US of the long-term deployment and permanent stationing of its strategic assets deep within the Indo-Pacific, saying, "It clearly marks a threatening development to the regional security."
"The Asia Pacific region is not a fragile area where the US can shift the balance at will using a few units of strategic combers," the KCNA said, warning the US would face "due backlash" from people in the region for its schemes. (Yonhap)

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