Middlesbrough in advanced talks with Rob Edwards to replace Michael Carrick
Former Luton Town head coach Rob Edwards is in advanced discussions to become the next Middlesbrough manager.
There is increasing expectation on Teesside that the 42-year-old will be named as Michael Carrick's successor at the Riverside Stadium.
Edwards, who left Luton in January, will be expected to re-energise the team and mount a Premier League promotion challenge.
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Edwards was in charge of Luton for Middlesbrough's biggest home win of last season – also Luton's heaviest defeat – and remained at the helm for another two months after the 5-1 loss to Carrick's side.
But he left Kenilworth Road midway through a hugely frustrating campaign, which ultimately ended in relegation to League One under his successor, Matt Bloomfield.
It was a second consecutive relegation for Luton, following their demotion from the Premier League in 2023-24.
But it is Edwards' achievement of overseeing Luton's unforeseen promotion to the Premier League via a Wembley play-off victory over Coventry City in 2023 that is likely to have appealed to Middlesbrough's owner-chairman Steve Gibson and the club's sporting director Kieran Scott – as they seek a return to the top flight after eight straight seasons in the Championship.
Scott and Edwards know each other from Wolves, where Edwards began his coaching career with the Under-18s. Edwards was a contender for the Middlesbrough post when Carrick was appointed in October 2022.
Edwards took the Luton job a month later and their promotion the following May, plus their spirited efforts in the top flight despite their economic disadvantage, saw his stock rise.
He had previously led Forest Green Rovers from League Two to League One in 2021-22 in his first job in the Football League. Watford then poached Edwards, where he only lasted four months.
Carrick was dismissed a fortnight ago at the end of his second full season, after the north-east outfit finished four points outside the Championship play-offs places, in 10th, after winning just one of their final six matches of the campaign.
The former Manchester United midfielder led Middlesbrough into the play-offs in his first season in charge but they have narrowly missed out on a top-six finish in the previous two seasons.
Middlesbrough have not been in the Premier League since 2017.
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There is an argument to make that loss limits should be adjusted in line with those costs, but to suggest they are the primary driver of increased losses overall looks a limited reading of things. Those other expenses as a proportion of turnover went from 19.6 per cent to 24.3 per cent between 2014 and 2024, a rise of 4.7 per cent. That is still less than the rise in wages as a proportion of turnover (5.8 per cent), and well below the 10.5 per cent difference seen in transfer fee amortisation costs, which have grown from 16.9 per cent of revenues to 27.4 per cent across the same period. The status quo will remain for at least another year. A mooted shift to mirroring UEFA's updated financial rules, namely a 'squad-cost ratio' that seeks to limit football-related spending, is still to be agreed upon, so the Premier League's existing PSR rules will operate across 2025-26. A 'shadow' squad-cost regime will remain in the background, without fear of non-compliance. 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Premier League clubs over the past 12 years have enjoyed greater riches than ever before yet continue to lose huge sums, principally because of their refusal to reduce spending on player wages and transfers. Last year's wage stagnation might actually be evidence of PSR rules, and what happens when you break them, having the effect of constraining wage growth, though time will tell. The rules, based as they are on limiting losses, encourage player sales for those in fear of a breach. But a deeper issue lies in how clubs arrived at that point in the first place. (Top photos: Getty Images)
