Palestinians killed at Netzarim corridor as Israeli forces open fire at food aid site
Israeli fire killed at least 25 Palestinians including 15 people who were waiting for food aid.
Witnesses said thousands had gathered overnight hopeful for aid when Israeli forces opened fire at about 01:00.
An additional 10 Palestinians were killed in separate incidents on Thursday.
Gaza's civil defence agency said an Israeli fire killed at least 25 people on Thursday, including 15 who had gathered near an aid distribution site.
Civil defence official Mohammad al-Mughayyir told AFP that 15 people were killed and 60 wounded while waiting for aid in central Gaza's Netzarim corridor, where thousands of people have gathered daily in the hope of receiving rations.
The Israeli army told AFP it was "looking into" the reports.
Witness Bassam Abu Shaar said thousands of people had gathered overnight in the hope of receiving aid at the US- and Israeli-backed distribution site when it opened in the morning.
"Around 01:00, they started shooting at us. The gunfire intensified from tanks, aircraft and quadcopter bombs," he told AFP by phone.
He said the size of the crowd had made it impossible for people to escape the Israeli fire near Shuhada Junction, and dead and wounded were left lying on the ground within walking distance of the distribution point run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
We couldn't help them or even escape ourselves
Bassam Abu Shaar
Mughayyir said the casualties had been taken to the Al-Awda and Al-Aqsa hospitals, in north and central Gaza respectively.
Dozens of Palestinians have been killed in recent weeks while trying to reach aid distribution points in Gaza, which is suffering from famine-like conditions, according to United Nations (UN) agencies operating in the territory.
Israeli restrictions on media in the Gaza Strip and difficulties in accessing some areas mean AFP is unable to independently verify the tolls and details provided by the civil defence agency.
In early March, Israel imposed an aid blockade on the territory amid a deadlock in truce negotiations, only partially easing restrictions in late May.
After Israel loosened its blockade, the privately-run Gaza Humanitarian Foundation began distributing aid, but its operations have been marred by chaotic scenes.
UN agencies and major aid groups have refused to cooperate with the foundation over concerns it was designed to cater to Israeli military objectives.
Elsewhere in Gaza, another 10 people were killed by Israeli fire on Thursday, the civil defence agency said.
Three were killed by Israeli shelling of a residential building in Gaza City, while seven were killed in a strike on Al-Shati refugee camp to its west.
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Fox News
17 minutes ago
- Fox News
The new map that could be guiding Trump's Middle East moves
Video President Donald Trump came back into office promising no new wars. So far, he's kept that promise. But he's also left much of Washington — and many of America's allies — confused by a series of rapid, unexpected moves across the Middle East. In just a few months, Trump has reopened backchannels with Iran, then turned around and threatened its regime with collapse. He's kept Israel at arm's length — skipping it on his regional tour — before signaling support once again. He lifted U.S. sanctions on Syria's Islamist leader, a figure long treated as untouchable in Washington. And he made headlines by hosting Pakistan's top general at the White House, even as India publicly objected. For those watching closely, it's been hard to pin down a clear doctrine. Critics see improvisation — sometimes even contradiction. But step back, and a pattern begins to emerge. It's not about ideology, democracy promotion, or traditional alliances. It's about access. Geography. Trade. More specifically, it may be about restarting a long-stalled infrastructure project meant to bypass China — and put the United States back at the center of a strategic economic corridor stretching from India to Europe. The project is called the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor, or IMEC. Most Americans have never heard of it. It was launched in 2023 at the G20 summit in New Delhi, as a joint initiative among the U.S., India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the European Union. Its goal? To build a modern infrastructure link connecting South Asia to Europe — without passing through Chinese territory or relying on Chinese capital. IMEC's vision is bold but simple: Indian goods would travel west via rail and ports through the Gulf, across Israel, and on to European markets. Along the way, the corridor would connect not just trade routes, but energy pipelines, digital cables, and logistics hubs. It would be the first serious alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative — a way for the U.S. and its partners to build influence without boots on the ground. But before construction could begin, war broke out in Gaza. The October 2023 Hamas attacks and Israel's military response sent the region into crisis. Normalization talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel fell apart. The Red Sea became a warzone for shipping. And Gulf capital flows paused. The corridor — and the broader idea of using infrastructure to tie the region together — was quietly shelved. Video That's the backdrop for Trump's current moves. Taken individually, they seem scattered. Taken together, they align with the logic of clearing obstacles to infrastructure. Trump may not be drawing maps in the Situation Room. But his instincts — for leverage, dealmaking and unpredictability — are removing the very roadblocks that halted IMEC in the first place. His approach to Iran is a prime example. In April, backchannels were reopened on the nuclear front. In May, a Yemen truce was brokered — reducing attacks on Gulf shipping. In June, after Israeli strikes inside Iran, Trump escalated rhetorically, calling for Iran's "unconditional surrender." That combination of engagement and pressure may sound erratic. But it mirrors the approach that cleared a diplomatic path with North Korea: soften the edges, then apply public pressure. Meanwhile, Trump's temporary distancing from Israel is harder to miss. He skipped it on his regional tour and avoided aligning with Prime Minister Netanyahu's continued hard-line approach to Gaza. Instead, he praised Qatar — a U.S. military partner and quiet mediator in the Gaza talks — and signaled support for Gulf-led reconstruction plans. The message: if Israel refuses to engage in regional stabilization, it won't control the map. Trump also made the unexpected decision to lift U.S. sanctions on Syria's new leader, President Ahmad al-Sharaa — a figure with a past in Islamist groups, now leading a transitional government backed by the UAE. Critics saw the move as legitimizing extremism. But in practice, it unlocked regional financing and access to transit corridors once blocked by U.S. policy. Even the outreach to Pakistan — which angered India — fits a broader infrastructure lens. Pakistan borders Iran, influences Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and maintains ties with Gulf militaries. Welcoming Pakistan's military chief was less about loyalty, and more about leverage. In corridor politics, geography often trumps alliances. None of this means Trump has a master plan. There's no confirmed strategy memo that links these moves to IMEC. And the region remains volatile. Iran's internal stability is far from guaranteed. The Gaza conflict could reignite. Saudi and Qatari interests don't always align. But there's a growing logic underneath the diplomacy: de-escalate just enough conflict to make capital flow again — and make corridors investable. That logic may not be ideologically pure. It certainly isn't about spreading democracy. But it reflects a real shift in U.S. foreign policy. Call it infrastructure-first geopolitics — where trade routes, ports and pipelines matter more than treaties and summits. To be clear, the United States isn't the only player thinking this way. China's Belt and Road Initiative has been advancing the same model for over a decade. Turkey, Iran and Russia are also exploring new logistics and energy corridors. But what sets IMEC apart — and what makes Trump's recent moves notable — is that it offers an opening for the U.S. to compete without large-scale military deployments or decades-long aid packages. Even the outreach to Pakistan — which angered India — fits a broader infrastructure lens. Pakistan borders Iran, influences Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and maintains ties with Gulf militaries. For all his unpredictability, Trump has always had a sense for economic leverage. That may be what we're seeing here: less a doctrine than a direction. Less about grand visions, and more about unlocking chokepoints. There's no guarantee it will work. The region could turn on a dime. And the corridor could remain, as it is now, a partially built concept waiting on political will. But Trump's moves suggest he's trying to build the conditions for it to restart — not by talking about peace, but by making peace a condition for investment. In a region long shaped by wars over ideology and territory, that may be its own kind of strategy. Tanvi Ratna is a policy analyst and engineer with a decade of experience in statecraft at the intersection of geopolitics, economics, and technology. She has worked on Capitol Hill, at EY, at CoinDesk and others, shaping policy across sectors from manufacturing to AI. Follow her takes on statecraft on X and Substack.
Yahoo
40 minutes ago
- Yahoo
This is the ‘beginning of the end' for Iran's supreme leader. But what comes next?
In his many years as Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei has gained a reputation for political caution; deep conservatism; and absolute ruthlessness. But above all, he is stubborn. Faced with the killing of numerous members of his military high command, the destruction of swathes of the Islamic Republic's treasured nuclear program and with enemy jets operating freely over his capital, he responded to Donald Trump's demand for surrender this week by declaring: 'The Iranian nation will stand firmly against any imposed war, just as it always has.' 'The Iranian nation also firmly stands against any imposed peace. The Iranian nation will not capitulate to anyone in the face of coercion,' the 86-year-old cleric went on. It is fighting talk. But many believe it is at odds with reality. 'It is becoming clearer every day that this is the beginning of the end of the regime in Tehran,' says Lina Khatib, visiting scholar with the Harvard Kennedy School's Middle East Initiative. 'My crystal ball does not tell me how long it will take. But I do not see how the Islamic Republic – as it has been [for] over more than five decades – can survive this war.' Of course, it is not inevitable that Khamenei will fall. But the decisive moment may come sooner rather than later. Trump on Thursday gave Khamenei a two-week deadline to make a deal to end its nuclear programme and defuse the crisis. At the end of the fortnight, the US president will make a decision about 'whether or not to go' – in other words, to send American bombers to join the Israeli assault. Any such move would tip the scales of the conflict even more dramatically against Iran. But what would happen next? Could American bombs provide the shock to ignite a revolution, led by ordinary Iranians fed up with the corruption, mismanagement and repression that has marked the rule of the Ayatollahs? Or could the supreme leader face an internal coup by insiders determined to hold on to power? Might he even fall victim to the strongmen of his own Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), who control the bulk of the military and much of the economy? Would his downfall be followed by democracy, military dictatorship, or anarchy? Or might Iranians rally to the flag, unexpectedly giving the Islamic Republic a new lease of legitimacy? 'That is the $10 billion question, and it's clearly at the forefront of everybody's minds,' says Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. 'Unless the Israelis are going to put boots on the ground in Iran, a country that has 90 million people and is geographically huge, what will likely ensue is changes within the system at a faster pace, and I think that's what they're trying to push for.' 'They know very well that they cannot engage in regime change, but they're trying to unscrew the bolts and see how the dominoes fall.' It has been reported that Trump vetoed an Israeli plan to kill Khamenei on the first night of the war. The US president has since said he knows exactly where the supreme leader is – and in a less than subtle threat to reconsider the Israeli assassination plan, said he was safe 'for now.' On Thursday, Israel Katz, the Israeli defence minister, said Khamenei 'can no longer be allowed to exist' after an Iranian attack struck a hospital in Beersheba, injuring dozens of people. Israeli officials seem to believe the supreme leader's removal might spark an uprising that would bring down the entire Islamic Republic, effectively unwinding the 1979 revolution that brought it to power. Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly called on Iranian citizens to do just that. 'We are also clearing the path for you to achieve your objective – which is freedom', he said in an address (in English) addressed to Iranians after the first wave of strikes killed top leaders. 'Now is the opportunity for you to stand up,' he added. That did not go down well even among most opposition-minded Iranians, many of whom have expressed fury at the Israeli bombing of central Tehran. That said, should Khameini be killed, people may well take to the streets, says Maryam Mazrooei, an exiled artist and photojournalist. 'But one of the main problems for the opposition is that there is no leader. The Islamic Republic has got rid of whoever could be leader now – everybody,' Mazrooei says. The regime tolerates a reformist wing. But over the past decade and a half, regime authorities have systematically jailed, exiled, or killed critics demanding fundamental changes to the Islamic Republic. And now, the disgruntled Iranians, who a revolution would rely on, are currently literally running for their lives. Many have fled Tehran for the relative safety of family homes in the provinces following a series of airstrikes on residential parts of the capital – and Israeli warnings that more are to come. Credit: IRINN And even if revolutionaries take to the streets, the uprising would likely meet stern and bloody resistance. The apparatus of repression that the government has used to suppress previous uprisings remains in place. The IRGC, police, and Basij militia have spent the past few years preparing to crush what they anticipate will be an enormous anti-regime uprising when Khamenei eventually dies. Their raison d'etre is to provide regime continuity. To imagine they would simply vanish or lose their power with Khamenei's assassination is a dangerous simplification. That is not to say a revolution can be ruled out, or that the security services might not split or melt away, as often happens in such moments. But it would almost certainly be violent, and the chance of success is slim. And as Mazrooei notes, there is no Iranian Nelson Mandela or Alexei Navalny behind whom an opposition movement might rally. Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the self-proclaimed National Council of Resistance of Iran, is almost universally despised inside the country. Reza Pahlavi Shah, the exiled crown prince, enjoys the support of a small but fanatical monarchist movement and has offered to act as a figurehead for a democratic some non-monarchists have begun to think of him as the best figurehead on offer. But he is not the most adept politician. He infuriated many this week with an interview appearing to defend the Israeli bombing campaign rather than condemning strikes on Iranian civilians. 'He will emerge bruised and battered by supporting Israel's attack on Iran,' says Dr Vakil. 'The fact that he is calling on Iranians to rise up at a time of a war is tone deaf, and the fact that he is not looking out for Iranians, for civilians, considering the trauma of this experience for the people that are living through it, is reflective of the daylight between his potential leadership and the facts on the ground in Iran.' 'If the Israelis kill the supreme leader, the system will evolve, either constitutionally or through change from within. They're not going to be flying in their leader of choice from the diaspora,' she adds. The Iranian regime is already geared up for a transition of power. Ali Khamenei is elderly and ill. The question of succession already dominates Iranian politics, and several prominent figures are thought to see themselves as candidates to replace him. Before the war, the most likely successor was thought to be Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's 55 year old son. Like his father, he studied theology in the Holy City of Qom, so he meets the constitutional requirement for clerical training. He is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, giving him revolutionary credibility. And most importantly, he has close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, meaning he has the backing of the men with guns. One IRGC member told The Telegraph last year that the corps 'top commanders are speaking very highly of him'. Another said plans had already been made to crush any opposition to his succession. Assuming he is still alive, that the Islamic Republic's constitutional mechanism continues to work, and that enough of his allies in the IRGC have escaped Israeli bombs, he is probably still best placed to succeed his father. Others might take the opportunity for a less constitutional route to power. The Israelis have achieved deep intelligence penetration of the Iranian command structures. Rumours are already flying around Iranian internet users about generals supposedly working for Mossad, or being spirited into Israel just before the bombs hit. But it does not take an Israeli conspiracy to make a coup. It is possible to imagine a delegation of senior Army or IRGC officers, fed up with the old man's intransigence and desperate to make peace, paying a visit to Khamenei and telling him gently that his time is up. 'This has been my prognosis for a while: that either when Khamenei dies or before he dies, some group of people will effectively do some sort of a coup inside the Islamic Republic and come to power,' says Arash Azizi, an Iranian historian. One key candidate was Ali Shamkhani, a key security advisor to Mr Khamenei who was reported killed in the first wave of Israeli strikes, but who was then revealed to have survived the bomb sent for him. His unlikely resurrection is already fuelling the rumour mill. 'He is the head of a really financial, political, military empire. He is really one of those people who has actual power with his person and his network, which is not the case with a lot of others,' says Azizi. 'I think he's in hospital and I think his leg has been amputated. So he is probably not in a very good condition to lead a coup, but you know, he is, he is the kind of guy who could do it.' Like most power brokers in Iran, Shamkhani has close ties to the IRGC – he was an admiral in its naval wing for many years. He also runs his own media empire. Another potential player is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament, former mayor of Tehran, and one-time IRGC air force commander who has made no secret of his presidential ambitions. 'He is very bad at hiding his ambitions to be a sort of strong man,' says Azizi. He has, however, failed in several bids for the presidency. Shamkhani and Ghalibaf represent a class of cynical, ambitious, and wealthy officials who Azizi believes are likely to shape Iran's future. They are defined by immense wealth, ties to the security services, and a pragmatic approach to ideology that reflects the general public's disillusionment with the Islamic Republic's revolutionary creed. But neither of those men are qualified to be a supreme leader – that role is reserved for Islamic scholars – so to seize power they might have to upend the Islamic Republic's Constitution. The exact result – a puppet supreme leader, a formal military dictatorship led by the IRGC, or something else – makes little difference to the bottom line. The IRGC – or at least the factions of the sprawling organisation closest to the winning strong man – would retain and tighten its grip on economic, political, and military power. In the interests of regime survival and personal enrichment, they might give up the nuclear program and usher in a period of relative liberalisation, just as Nikita Khrushchev did away with the worst repressions of Stalin. That would suit Israel – but not the millions of Iranians yearning to see the back of the corrupt and violent gang who have ruled them for so long. And of course, there is no guarantee they would change course. There are plenty of people who believe Khamanei's mistake was not to rush to a bomb earlier. That said, rumours are now swirling about a kind of national-unity government with a more reformist bent. That theory centres on Hassan Rouhani, a former president and security advisor who is the nearest thing the regime has to a centrist. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister who negotiated the landmark 2015 nuclear deal between Iran, the US and a number of other world powers, and Ali Larijani, a former speaker of parliament, have also been mentioned. That is a lineup that might conceivably end the nuclear program, give up on militarisation and the forever war with Israel, and institute some domestic reform. 'Rouhani is the leader of what you can call a centrist, pragmatic camp. He's Iran's Deng Xiaoping,' says Azizi. 'The problem is, of course, he is a mullah, not a guy with guns. He's not an IRGC guy. The question is, can he, as a political leader, put together enough of a coalition that includes some of the people with the money and guns?' There is of course, another, much darker possibility. If Khamenei falls, but no faction can secure the succession, the country could fall into a period of anarchy – possibly even civil war. Pummelled by Israeli airstrikes, crippled by enduring sanctions, and riven by ethnic, religious, and regional divisions (Persians make up roughly half of the country's population, with about a quarter Azeri or Turkic people, including Khamenei, and the remainder comprised of Balochs, Kurds, Arabs, Jews Assyrians, and Armenians), Iran would effectively be crippled. That might suit Netanyahu perfectly well. A failed state cannot, after all, run an ambitious national project such as a nuclear weapons program. Nor would it be able to continue to project influence across the Middle East by other means. But for those who call Iran home, that would be the worst possible outcome. The truth, say both Dr Khatib and Dr Vakil, is that all bets are off. Iran is facing a moment of incredible volatility. The most likely successor may be someone no one has heard of, and the most likely course of events is one that no one can predict. Those wild cards include the ranks of political prisoners held in Tehran's infamous Evin prison, who would no doubt welcome Khamenei's fall. Even, they appear gloomy about what might follow, however. 'I know that some segments of the people are happy with the [Israeli] attacks, because they see it as the only way to change the failed clerical government,' Mostafa Tajzadeh, a former deputy interior minister and vocal critic of Khamenei, wrote on his Telegram channel from behind bars this week. 'But even assuming that the war leads to such an outcome, Iran will be left in ruins, where, most likely, statelessness and chaos will prevail – if the country is not torn apart.'
Associated Press
40 minutes ago
- Associated Press
How the AP decided to refer to the conflict between Israel and Iran as a war
The Associated Press is calling the current conflict between Israel and Iran a war, given the scope, intensity and duration of military activities on both sides. Other news organizations also have decided to refer to the conflict as a war, while some are still sticking with words such as 'conflict' or 'fighting.' Why does it matter? When a conflict in the world spills into military action, it's important to use the correct terms to describe it. Sometimes a one-sided attack occurs without further action, or a conflict bubbles up and then ends quickly Using 'war' widely to describe these kinds of situations can diminish the word's importance. Then, when actual war breaks out, people might not understand its significance. What does the AP consider? The Merriam-Webster definition of war is quite broad: 'A state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations,' or 'a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism.' The fight between Israel and Iran meets those criteria, though neither has officially declared war. Since Israel launched an air campaign targeting Iran's military and nuclear program, there has been a significant escalation in the conflict. Iran has launched hundreds of missiles and drones into Israel. Israel has assassinated high-level Iranian officials; targeted the country's infrastructure; called for hundreds of thousands of residents to evacuate Iran's capital, Tehran; and said it will continue its offensive. What are previous examples of conflicts where the AP issued guidance to use the word 'war'? The AP provided guidance on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas war in the days and weeks after fighting began. In both cases, editors considered the number of casualties, the intensity of fighting, the involvement of each party, and what each country was calling the conflict. In both cases, the AP started using the word 'war' to describe the conflicts. Why is it 'war' and not 'War'? AP capitalizes the word 'war' only as part of a formal name, which as of now does not exist. Could the guidance change? Decisions on how AP uses the term 'war' happen in real time. AP's news leaders and standards editors will continue to monitor developments to see whether changes are necessary. At this point, the level of fighting constitutes the countries being at war, no matter what happens next. If fighting were to end soon, AP would continue saying the countries had been at war. News leaders would consider whether the level of fighting at that time amounted to being at war. If other countries intervene in the war, AP would describe the intervention as military action in support of Israel or military support of Iran. AP would also consider whether the action constitutes those countries also being at war.
