AI Hub makes debut at top film industry trade show in Hong Kong
A dedicated
artificial intelligence zone highlighting cutting-edge film production solutions is a feature of Hong Kong's Filmart, Asia's largest movie trade show, for the first time as the city embraces AI to boost high-quality productivity and upgrade traditional industries.
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The 29th Hong Kong International Film and TV Market, or Filmart, opened on Monday at the Convention and Exhibition Centre in Wan Chai as part of the Trade Development Council's annual Entertainment Expo.
Filmart has put together an AI Hub pilot programme featuring exhibitions from the Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts, Sony and Lenovo, with industry leaders sharing insights, including the production team of mainland Chinese animated blockbuster Ne Zha 2.
'Each company possesses its own AI technologies. There is a lack of opportunity for everyone to come together and understand each other's capabilities,' said Mak Chun-hung, president of the Association of Motion Picture Post Production Professionals.
'This time, the organiser wants us to take on the role of creating a platform to showcase what they have.
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'It's like a general catalogue where you can list what you have, and then everyone can come together at this opportunity to start testing and developing AI in filmmaking.'
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