Hamdok: Retaking Khartoum or Forming a Government Won't End Sudan's War
Former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has warned that recent military gains by the Sudanese army, including the recapture of Khartoum, will not bring an end to the country's devastating civil war.
Speaking on the sidelines of the Mo Ibrahim Governance Forum in Morocco, Hamdok dismissed efforts by the Port Sudan-based authorities to appoint a new prime minister and form a government, calling them 'fake' and 'irrelevant.'
There is no military solution to this conflict, Hamdok told The Associated Press, adding that whether Khartoum is taken or not, 'it doesn't matter,' as neither side can achieve a decisive victory.
The forum, held in Marrakech from June 1 to 3, brought together African and international leaders to discuss governance and development challenges across the continent.
Sudan's conflict dominated the discussions, with members of the civilian coalition Sumud - led by Hamdok - highlighting the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe and rejecting military-led political maneuvers.
Sumud leaders warned that attempts to restore Sudan's African Union membership, suspended after the 2021 military coup, could legitimize a flawed political process. They urged the international community not to fall into what they described as a 'trap' by recognizing unrepresentative governance.
More than two years of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have left at least 24,000 dead, though many believe the true toll is far higher. Over 13 million people have been displaced, including 4 million who fled to neighboring countries. Famine and disease, including cholera, are spreading rapidly.
Despite the army's territorial gains and the recent appointment of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as prime minister, the RSF has regrouped in Darfur and advanced in other regions, including Kordofan. Hamdok dismissed suggestions that these developments signal an end to the war, calling such claims 'nonsense.'
Hamdok, Sudan's first civilian prime minister in decades, led a fragile transition following the 2019 ouster of Omar al-Bashir. He resigned in early 2022 after a military coup derailed efforts at democratic reform. Now, he warns that genuine peace is impossible without addressing Sudan's deep-rooted issues, including regional inequality, identity conflicts, and the role of religion in governance.
'Any attempt to rebuild the country while fighting continues is absurd,' Hamdok said. 'Trusting the military to deliver democracy is a dangerous illusion.'
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