It's time to slash net overseas migration, so spare us your growth and diversity lectures before we suffer the same fate as the UK

News this week that we are now importing people faster than we can house them is proof that, as tax-paying citizens, we are in fact the government's last priority.
Not only is the maths on this mind boggling but good luck trying to speak out against the ethos of our much-vaunted Big Australia super speed migration policy pioneered by former PM Kevin Rudd.
You'll be dismissed as a racist, a xenophobe and stuck wistfully in the 1960s when those of white Anglo-descent were the majority and everyone drove a Holden built at the Elizabeth plant in South Australia.Let's for a minute consider the data.
In March 2024, our population hit 27.1 million and according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 83 per cent of the 615,300 increase came from net overseas migration.
Births and deaths, classed as 'natural increase' accounted for the other 17 per cent.And in regard to the numbers released this week, there's no wriggle room to argue that it's good news for young Aussies already resigned to never owning their own home.
In plain speaking, if your population grows faster than your ability to house it, rents explode and housing supply crashes.
Everyone suffers, ultimately.
PM Anthony Albanese's government had promised 1.2 million homes in five years.
According to this week's State of the Housing System 2025 report, that plan is now a fantasy because we'll miss the target by at least 260,000 homes.
Meanwhile, our net overseas migration exceeds 500,000 people a year.
To keep up with population growth driven by immigration, industry experts say Australia must build around 240,000 new homes each year.With each migrant household averaging 2.5 people, the result here is catastrophic.
We're reportedly going backwards by more than 1000 homes every single week.
Meanwhile the PM chose his address at the National Press Club on Tuesday to finally admit what the rest of us have complained about for years.
Endless regulation has made it next to impossible to build or buy a home in this country.
Planning laws, heritage overlays, environmental assessments and zoning restrictions might make sense on their own but stacked together?
Australia needs to take a pickaxe to net overseas migration until our housing supply catches up to save us from the deepening housing crisis, rising homelessness and a strained health service that is pummelling the UK, writes Louise Roberts. Picture: John Grainger/News Corp
It's a bureaucratic quagmire that sinks housing before a single brick is slathered with concrete and laid.
In other words, getting a project off the ground is now so complicated and expensive, it's no wonder the country is in the middle of a housing crisis.
Sure, about time someone in Canberra said this out loud but why not go further and admit we need a housing-first migration policy too to help fix this crisis?
Australia's immigration program should serve the national interest and not those of universities or developers chasing cheap labour.
A flood of student or temporary visa holders puts immediate strain on the housing market long before they start making a real 'impact' on the economy.
Housing is a fundamental right not a high-end privilege.
But thanks to years of inaction from both sides of politics, owning a home has become a fugazi with first-home buyers locked out while governments tinker around the edges.
Also, criticising immigration policy is not racist.
The debate is about capacity and fairness, not culture or ethnicity.Conflating the two is dishonest because this isn't about 'closing the borders'.
It's about calibrating immigration to match infrastructure and housing capacity.
We don't have to look far for proof that mass migration without infrastructure planning leads to disaster.In the financial year ending June 2023, the UK recorded record-high net migration of more than 670,000 people.
The result?
A deeper housing crisis, rising homelessness and an even more strained National Health Service.
The Office for Budget Responsibility said high immigration levels are not improving per capita living standards.
It's no surprise that they've started slashing visas and tightening rules for dependents.Even Canada, revered as a model of open immigration, is now dramatically reducing its student visa intake and migration after backlash from citizens.
Surely it is time to slash net overseas migration here until housing supply catches up.
We don't need a lecture about growth and diversity.
If we want a fair go especially for young Aussies, we must have the courage to say that our nation is full, for now.
Louise Roberts is a journalist and editor who has worked as a TV and radio commentator in Australia, the UK and the US. Louise is a winner of the Peter Ruehl Award for Outstanding Columnist in the NRMA Kennedy Awards for Excellence in Journalism and has been shortlisted in other awards for her opinion work

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One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved, but...

Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours.

Sky News AU

14 hours ago

• Sky News AU

‘Net negative': Positive Economics Advisory's David Williams-Chen delivers warning as Labor mulls family trust tax changes

Labor imposing a flat tax rate on family trusts could be a 'net negative' for the economy, an expert has warned after a report arose the government is considering trusts in its raft of tax reforms. Sources told the Australian Financial Review Labor is likely to propose higher taxes on family trusts as Treasury ramps up scrutiny of the tax-friendly investment vehicles in its economic reforms. Many Australian families and businesses use the trusts to protect their assets and split income between beneficiaries to reap the benefits from the lower tax rates. The report follows Labor proposing a minimum 30 per cent tax rate on trusts as part of its failed swath of tax reforms it took to the 2019 election. Positive Economics Advisory's managing director David Williams-Chen said if Labor were to apply a flat tax rate, Aussies would find a way to avoid it. 'People will respond to incentives and we see this time and again,' Mr Williams-Chen told 'Whether it's smokers buying black market tobacco to avoid paying high price cigarettes as excise levies have increased. 'Or whether it's the wealthy who have taken advantage of lower tax settings in superannuation before balance transfer caps and contribution limits came into place. 'We know there'd be a response.' He pointed to research from US academics Shahar Rotberg and Joseph Steinberg where it was found increasing wealth taxes incentivised people to hide their assets and resulted in lower tax revenue. Mr Williams-Chen urged the government to keep in mind taxpayers' capacity to avoid other taxes and even warned this could lead to a situation shown in the work of Rotberg and Steinberg. 'The evidence from the US shows that once the behavioural responses to wealth taxes on capital are factored in, there's a likelihood that they're actually negative for the economy,' he said. 'Rotberg and Steinberg in 2024 found wealth taxes would cause an overall decline in economic welfare between 0.3 and 0.4 percent.' The individuals who are the beneficiaries of a trust pay their personal income tax rate on the distributions. This means the tax paid on a trust can vary from zero per cent to 47 per cent. Labor considering changes to family trusts, alongside plans to tax high earning super accounts and wind back electric vehicle rebates, come as Labor faces a decade of deficits and ballooning costs of the NDIS and defence. The Albanese government also faces reduced tax revenue from lower tobacco excise and falling fossil fuel exports as Australia continues on its renewables shift.