The rise of neighbourhood bars in Hong Kong, from Honky Tonks Tavern and The Pontiac to Bar Leone

For over a decade, Hong Kong has been at the forefront of
Asia's bar scene . In 2011, Ozone opened, setting a record as the highest bar in the world, and 12 months later came the launch of Quinary, Hong Kong's
ground zero for molecular mixology . In the years that followed, many other concepts specialising in high-end service and a more 'scientific' approach to bartending started to crowd the streets of Central – the likes of The Old Man, Argo and Artifact to name but a few. When The Old Man was ranked Asia's best bar in 2019, molecular mixology was well and truly king in Hong Kong.
The staff at Honky Tonks Tavern. Photo: Handout
Trends come and go, though, and in recent years there has been a shift in the bar scene, with guests opting for concepts positioning themselves as neighbourhood bars, rather than hotel-based venues and other high-end spots. This movement was solidified at Asia's 50 Best Bar Awards last year, which
crowned Bar Leone first place in Asia , and second on the World's Best Bars list for 2024.
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While there is more than enough room in the city for every kind of concept, we asked three bartenders and owners across the city – Honky Tonks Tavern's Jake Erder, The Pontiac's Jen Queen and Bar Leone's Lorenzo Antinori – for their take on this trend, and why Hong Kong might be steering towards a more casual beverage experience.
Outside Honky Tonks Tavern for their fourth-anniversary celebration in 2024. Photo: Handout
'If you look around Honky, you'll find a museum of the American beverage world,' says Erder. 'Over the years, we've sourced vintage artworks, bottles, cans and other memorabilia from different eras. After working here for two years I still find little treasures as we are forever changing the decor.'
For Erder, the main appeal of the city's neighbourhood bars is their comforting vibe. This is crucial as before a customer even opens the menu, the atmosphere, decor and overall feel of a bar are the first noticeable elements. Whether someone is blown away by the incredible interior design or has an irresistible urge to sing along to the playlist, a good atmosphere makes passers-by curious and keen to step inside.
Antonio Lai, the award-winning Hong Kong mixologist behind bars like Quinary, Origin and The Envoy. Photo: Handout
Some of Hong Kong's fancier bars can feel a little intimidating to the casual visitor. Upon entering Honky Tonks Tavern though, guests are immediately welcomed into a cosy and nostalgic space. The twinkling lights and wooden features give the bar a homely feel that guests can easily relax into.
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Asia Times

5 hours ago

• Asia Times

China's industrial policy has an unprofitability problem

Analyzing American economic policy isn't that interesting these days, except perhaps as a grim spectacle. So I've been thinking a little about Chinese economic policy. China's leaders leave much to be desired, but to their credit, they still think economic policy is about strengthening their nation, enriching their people and improving their technology instead of pursuing domestic culture wars by other means. Anyway, China has a lot of policy initiatives right now — cleaning up the fallout from the real estate bust, retaliating against America's tariffs, improving their health care system, and so on. But their most important policy — and the one everyone talks about here in the US — is their big industrial policy push. If you want to understand Chinese industrial policy, I recommend starting with Barry Naughton's free book, 'The Rise of China's Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020.' The basic story is that until the mid-to-late 2000s, China didn't have a national industrial policy as such. It had a bunch of local governments trying to build up specific industries, usually by attracting investment from multinational companies. And it had a central government that tried to make it easy for local governments to do that, using macro policies like making sure coal was cheap, holding down the value of the Chinese currency in order to stimulate exports and so on. But it was not until the end of Hu Jintao's term in office — and really, not until Xi Jinping came to power — that China developed a national industrial policy, in which the government tries to promote specific industries using tools like subsidies and cheap bank loans. If you want a good primer on just how big those loans and subsidies are, and which industries they're going to, I recommend CSIS' 2022 report, 'Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective.' It's a lot. Here are the authors' estimates from 2019: Source: CSIS In some respects, this policy was successful. For example, it moved China up the value chain — instead of doing simple low-value assembly for foreign manufacturers as in the 2000s, China in the 2010s learned to make many of the higher-value components that go into things like computers, phones and cars, as well as many of the tools that create those goods. This had the added security benefit of making China less dependent on foreign rivals for key manufacturing inputs. China has doubled down on its centralized, big-spending industrial policy since then. In 2021-22, China suffered a huge real estate bust, crippling a sector that had accounted for almost one-third of the country's GDP. China's leaders responded by doubling down on manufacturing, encouraging banks — essentially all of which are either state-owned or state-controlled — to shift their lending from real estate to industry. In 2023, you saw charts like this: Source: Shanghai Macro via Bert Hofman Along with this industrial policy, you saw a massive surge of Chinese-manufactured exports flowing out to the rest of the world. The most recent export surge has been labeled the 'Second China Shock', but in fact, the trend was already headed in that direction well before the pandemic: Source: CSIS China's competitive success in manufacturing industry after industry has been nothing short of spectacular. In just a couple of years, China went from a footnote in the global car industry to the world's leading auto exporter: Source: Visual Capitalist Obviously, this export surge is the most important way that people in countries like the US experience the results of China's industrial policy. So most commentary on the policy has focused on exports, trade balances and so on. But it's important to remember that most of what China is producing in this epic manufacturing surge is not being exported. For example, take cars. Even though China is now the world's top car exporter, most of the cars it makes are sold within China: Source: Brad Setser China's auto industry is actually unusually domestically focused, compared to other auto powerhouses like Germany, South Korea, and Japan: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion In fact, this pattern holds across the whole economy. For an industrialized country, China is unusually insular — its exports as a percent of its GDP are higher than the US, but much lower than France, the UK, Germany, or South Korea: Source: World Bank Most of China's enormous manufacturing subsidies are not actually for export manufacturing; they're for domestic manufacturing. The rest of the world is just getting a little bit of spillover from whatever Chinese companies can't manage to sell domestically — except for a country as huge as China, a 'little spillover' can seem like a massive flood to everyone else. And here lies the rub. Essentially, China is huge and most of its trading partners are pretty small. There's a limited amount of Chinese cars, semiconductors, electronics, robots, machine tools, ships, solar panels, and batteries they can buy. And on top of that, some of China's biggest trading partners are levying tariffs against it. For most Chinese manufacturers, export markets are simply not going to replace the domestic market. And this means that Chinese manufacturers will be forced to compete against each other for a domestic market whose size is relatively fixed, at least in the short term. That competition will eat away at their profit margins. In fact, this is already happening. Vicious price wars have broken out in the Chinese auto industry, and even the country's top carmakers are under extreme pressure: Chinese carmakers' price war is putting the industry's balance sheet under strain…Current liabilities exceeded current assets at more than a third of publicly listed car manufacturers at the end of last year…China's leading carmakers are being forced to…fight for market share amid heavy [price] discounting… The dominant electric-vehicle maker BYD is deepest in negative territory with its working capital, followed by rivals Geely, Nio, Seres and state-backed BAIC and JAC, while the total net current assets of 16 major listed Chinese carmakers [saw] a 62 per cent decline from…the first half of 2021… 'Given the current downward trend, China's auto industry is expected to enter an industry-wide elimination phase . . . in 2026 at the latest,' [an analyst] warned. 'During the process, some companies will die of liquidity crises.'… BYD recently came under pressure to defend its financial numbers and business practices after Wei Jianjun, chair of rival Great Wall Motor, called for a comprehensive audit of all major domestic carmakers…'An Evergrande exists in [China's] auto sector at the moment — it just hasn't blown up,' he told local media, raising the spectre of the industry following the property sector into a spiralling debt crisis. How can these mighty world-conquering automakers be skating on the edge of bankruptcy when the government is pouring so many subsidies and cheap loans into the auto industry? The answer is simple: China's government is paying its car companies to compete each other to death. The Chinese government pays a ton of different car companies to make more cars. Chinese banks, at the government's behest, give cheap loans to a bunch of different car companies to make more cars. So they all make more cars — more than Chinese consumers want to buy. So they try to sell some of the extra cars overseas, but foreigners only buy a modest amount of them. Now what? Unsold cars pile up, prices are cut and cut again, and all the car companies — even the best ones, like BYD — see their profit margins fall and fall. It's not just autos, either — similar things are happening in solar, steel, and a bunch of other industries. Manufacturing profit margins are plunging across China's entire economy: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion A Chinese buzzword for this sort of excessive competition is 'involution.' Why is this bad, though? Who cares about profit, anyway? After all, China's workers are getting jobs, and China's consumers are getting a ton of cheap cars and other manufactured stuff. So what if rich BYD shareholders and corporate executives take a loss? Well, in fact, there are several problems. The first is macroeconomic. Price wars across much of the economy create deflation. In fact, China is already experiencing deflation: China's consumer prices fell for a fourth consecutive month in May…with price wars in the auto sector adding to downward pressure…The consumer price index fell 0.1% from a year earlier…CPI slipped into negative territory in February, falling 0.7% from a year ago, and has continued to post year-on-year declines of 0.1% in March, April, and now May…Separately, deflation in the country's factory-gate or producer prices deepened, falling 3.3% from a year earlier in May[.] A lot of this is probably due to weak demand from the ongoing real estate bust, but price wars prompted by industrial policy will make it worse. Deflation will exacerbate the lingering problems from the real estate implosion. Debts are in nominal terms, meaning that when prices go down, those debts become harder to service. More of the debts go bad, and banks get weaker — all those bad loans on their books make them less willing to make new loans. Consumer debts get more onerous too, making consumers less willing to spend (and consumers, unlike banks, are not government-controlled). This effect is called debt deflation. On top of that, a massive wave of bankruptcies could cause a second bad-debt crisis on top of the one that's already happening from real estate. Wei Jianjun of Great Wall Motor has been warning of exactly this happening. In fact, we can already see Chinese banks beginning to slow the torrid pace of industrial loans they were dishing out a couple of years ago: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion All of this could extend China's growth slowdown for years. There are also microeconomic dangers from overcompetition. Competition could spur Chinese companies to just innovate harder. But if China's top manufacturers are constantly skating on the edge of bankruptcy, that means they'll have fewer resources to invest in long-term projects like technological innovation and new business models. Basically, prices are signals about what to build, and China's industrial policies are sending strong signals of 'build more stuff today' instead of 'build better stuff tomorrow.' There's also the danger that China's government won't allow the price wars to end. Ideally, you'd want these price wars to be temporary; eventually, you'd want weak producers to fail, allowing top producers to increase their profitability. This good outcome relies on the government eventually cutting subsidies and letting bad companies die. But letting bad companies die means a bunch of people get laid off. Bloomberg recently had a good report about the political pressures on the Chinese government to keep the subsidies flowing: Local leaders laden in debt are rolling out tax breaks and subsidies for companies, in a bid to stave off the double whammy of job and revenue losses…For China's top leaders, employment is an even more politically sensitive issue than economic growth, according to Neil Thomas, a fellow for Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis…Already there are signs the weakening labor market is becoming a touchy subject: One of China's largest online recruitment platforms Zhaopin Ltd. this year quietly stopped providing wage data it's compiled for at least a decade. Already, Bloomberg reports that economic protests are proliferating across the country; with the real estate crisis ongoing, the government will be under even more political pressure to keep manufacturing employment strong. This could mean keeping crappy companies on life support. These so-called 'zombie' companies, kept alive only by a never-ending flood of cheap credit, were a big part of why Japan's economy slowed down so much in the 1990s. So this is the scenario where China's industrial policy ends up backfiring. Subsidies and cheap bank loans dished out to high-quality and low-quality companies alike could flood the market with undesired product, spurring vicious cutthroat price wars, destroying profit margins, exacerbating deflation, and generally making the macroeconomic situation worse. And then China's government could double down by trying to protect employment, by never halting subsidies for companies that fail. Usually, when we think of the costs of industrial policy, the main thing we think about is waste, and there is certainly plenty of waste in China's current approach. But China's experience is illuminating a second problem with industrial policy — the risk of vicious price wars and deflation due to the subsidization of too many competing companies. This article was first published on Noah Smith's Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

RTHK

a day ago

• RTHK

Trump extends deadline for TikTok sale by 90 days

Trump extends deadline for TikTok sale by 90 days TikTok offices in Culver City, California. File photo: Reuters US President Donald Trump announced on Thursday that he had given social media platform TikTok another 90 days to find a non-Chinese buyer or be banned in the United States. "I've just signed the Executive Order extending the Deadline for the TikTok closing for 90 days [September 17, 2025]," Trump posted on his Truth Social platform, putting off the ban for the third time. A federal law requiring TikTok's sale or ban on national security grounds was due to take effect the day before Trump's January inauguration. The Republican, whose 2024 election campaign relied heavily on social media, has previously said he is fond of the video-sharing app. "I have a little warm spot in my heart for TikTok," Trump said in an NBC News interview in early May. "If it needs an extension, I would be willing to give it an extension." TikTok on Thursday welcomed Trump's decision. "We are grateful for President Trump's leadership and support in ensuring that TikTok continues to be available for more than 170 million American users," the platform said in a statement. (AFP)

HKFP

2 days ago

• HKFP

3 Hong Kong universities move up in QS top 50 rankings, with HKU jumping to 11th place

Three Hong Kong universities have climbed in education analytics firm QS's rankings of the world's top 50 institutions, with the University of Hong Kong (HKU) jumping to 11th place. Quacquarelli Symonds, also known as QS, released its new 2026 rankings on Thursday. HKU rose six spots from last year's rankings, moving from 17th to 11th place. It is the second-highest ranked university in Asia after the National University of Singapore, which came in 8th. The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) ranked 32nd, up from 36th place last year. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) saw its position move from 44th to 47th place. Two other universities, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU) and the City University of Hong Kong (CityU), made the top 100 list. PolyU ranked 54th, while CityU ranked 63rd. In a statement on Thursday, a spokesperson for the Education Bureau said the city's university rankings were encouraging and a testament to the government's long-term investment in higher education. The spokesperson said the rankings reflected Hong Kong's 'attractiveness as a hub for international talent.' Last month, Chief Executive John Lee pledged 'full support' to universities in attracting foreign students after US President Donald Trump moved to restrict the enrolment of international students at American universities. Some universities have announced streamlined application procedures for students affected by the US president's new policies. In the Chinese-language statement on Thursday, the government said it would continue to promote the diversity of the city's universities. It is 'not only to strengthen Hong Kong's development momentum, but also to actively contribute to [China]'s development,' the spokesperson added.