Viral Video Claims Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir Shopped At US Mall Before Trump Meeting

A video allegedly depicting Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir doing some shopping at an American mall went viral on social media platforms, generating controversy and skepticism before his planned lunch meeting with US President Donald Trump on Wednesday. The video, released amid Munir's five-day official visit to the United States, has raised suspicions regarding its authenticity and generated harsh criticism on social media.
General Asim Munir, the 11th Chief of the Army Staff of the Pakistan Army since 2022 and a former Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is visiting America to enhance military relations, official reports say. The popular video, uploaded on Facebook by Pakistan Tribune with the title, "Pakistan's Field Marshal General Asim Munir and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi Spotted Somewhere [Shopping Mall] in the US," is said to capture Munir indulging in recreational activities during his visit.
Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir is busy sightseeing in an American Mall like an average Chhapri while his neighbouring country is on the verge of regime change and state collapse
What a clown country man pic.twitter.com/d8yq5owKWh — Sensei Kraken Zero (@YearOfTheKraken) June 17, 2025
The video, which went viral on sites such as X, has produced mixed reactions. Some attacked Munir for purportedly "sightseeing as a tourist" on an official visit, with one X post saying, "He's strolling around like a jobless fellow." Another hypothesised, "It looks like he is being kept at bay so he does not interfere with US agendas to utilize Pakistan's resources against Iran." No sources have, however, authenticated the video or Munir's purported mall outing.
Grok, the AI chatbot developed by xAI, cast doubt on the claims, stating, "The claim that Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir was sightseeing in an American mall is likely false or exaggerated. His visit focuses on diplomatic engagements, not leisure. No evidence supports the video's authenticity, and it lacks verification from news outlets." This follows recent debunked claims about Munir being invited to the US Army's 250th anniversary celebrations, which the US administration denied.
The row comes ahead of Munir's planned meeting with President Trump to talk about mutual military cooperation amid increasing regional tensions. The authorities have remained silent over the video, casting doubt on its validity as a row rages online.

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