US Abraham Accords Caucus wants to support education in Morocco
The co-chairs of the Abraham Accords Caucus have introduced a resolution aimed at promoting peace and tolerance through education in several Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.
The resolution calls for reforms in school curricula to eliminate antisemitic content and hate speech while fostering inclusion and respect. « We have the responsibility to educate future generations on the values of peace and coexistence », stated Representative Brad Schneider.
The United States is encouraged to collaborate with international organizations, including the UN, to achieve these objectives. Representative Ann Wagner stressed the importance of rejecting intolerance to «deprive the Iranian regime of the hatred that fuels its violent agendas».
The Caucus seeks to strengthen the Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, by encouraging partnerships between signatory countries and expanding the agreement to nations without diplomatic relations with Israel. It has supported key legislation, including the Israel Relations Normalization Act, the DEFEND Act, and the MARITIME Act, as well as provisions of the NDAA on diplomatic and military cooperation. In the Senate, the caucus is co-chaired by James Lankford (R-OK), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Joni Ernst (R-IA), and Cory Booker (D-NJ).
The Caucus receives support from organizations such as the Atlantic Council, the Abraham Accords Peace Institute, AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, Hadassah, the U.S.-Israel Education Association, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the Israel Policy Forum, CUFI Action, the Jewish Federations of North America, and B'nai B'rith International.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Morocco World
8 hours ago
- Morocco World
US Officially Joins Israel in Strikes on Iran, Bombs Key Nuclear Sites
Rabat – The conflict between Israel and Iran has taken a major turn, with the United States now officially joining the fight. US President Donald Trump announced that American forces have carried out airstrikes on three nuclear sites in Iran: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. In a post on Truth Social, Trump said the attacks were 'very successful' and that all US planes have now left Iranian airspace. He added that a full set of bombs was dropped on the Fordow site and commended the US military. This marks a major development, as the United States now officially joins Israel in its attacks against Iran.
Ya Biladi
16 hours ago
- Ya Biladi
Rabat march planned in solidarity with Iran
The National Action Group for Palestine has announced a solidarity march with Iran, scheduled for this Sunday, June 22, in Rabat. On Friday, June 20, the NGO held a sit-in outside the House of Representatives to denounce what it described as «Israeli aggression against the Palestinian and Iranian peoples». The day before, the organizers held a press conference urging «the Moroccan people to turn out in large numbers for the June 22 march». The Moroccan Front for the Support of Palestine and Against Normalization has not yet confirmed whether it will take part in the Rabat march. This coalition, which includes Islamists from Al Adl wal Ihsane as well as members of the left, notably from the PSU, has already condemned «Israeli aggression» against Iran. On June 17, the Front's national secretariat criticized «the absence of our country from the list of Maghreb, Arab, and Islamic nations that signed the declaration condemning Zionist aggression against Iran's sovereignty». As a reminder, Morocco cut diplomatic ties with Iran on May 1, 2018, citing Iran-backed Hezbollah's military support for the Polisario militias. Iran has recognized the self-proclaimed «Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)» since 1980.
Morocco World
18 hours ago
- Morocco World
The MENA region: a Geopolitical Fault Line and Strategic Pivot in a Shifting Global Order
The MENA region is no longer simply the scene of rivalries between superpowers, it has become the field of a more complex battle, where global strategies – from Washington to Moscow, via Beijing – intersect with regional ambitions carried by regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. It is no longer enough to talk about the influence of the great powers, we will also have to look at the way decisions are made, the perceptions of leaders and the internal games that influence their choices. This is what the so-called Foreign Policy Analysis approach reveals, by focusing less on states as monolithic blocs than on decision-makers, their interests, their constraints and their perceptions of the world. The systemic and holistic approach to international crises and conflicts privileges macro-systemic factors much more than the strategy of the actors, in fact without a doubt the geopolitical changes in the MENA region are the result of a change in the balance of the international system which is going through a period of interregnum and where the dominant hegemonic power, the United States, although contested by revisionist countries in particular Russia and China, is coming back in force through various stratagems including the attempt to disconnect between Russia and China and the resolution of several conflicts that could increase its influence (war in Ukraine, conflict in the DRC, Sahara conflict, conflict between India and Pakistan etc ). A new era has been underway since the war in Ukraine in 2022 and the return of President D Trump to the White House, marked on the one hand by an eclipse of Russia from the Middle Eastern scene, preferring to focus on the consolidation of the Ukrainian front, and on the other hand a strong return of the United States in the MENA region, after the vacuum left by President B Obama's 'Pivot To Asia' doctrine, as well as a methodical build-up of Türkiye and Israel to secure or expand their zones of influence. The Middle Eastern situation would be nolens volens impacted by these changes, which have been accelerating and crescendo since the re-election of President Trump in 2024. Geopolitical restructuring of the MENA region The new geopolitical restructuring of the MENA region is still being finalized and its spatial-temporal limits are not known, the change is taking place in small steps in a gradual way, since the second Gulf War and the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Arab Spring which imploded several Arab regimes, with the countries of the rejection front at the forefront (Libya, Syria, Yemen). Türkiye appears poised to take considerable advantage of the recent upheavals in Syria and the Middle East, especially following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in late 2024 and the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency. The power vacuum left by the collapse of Assad offers Ankara a strategic opportunity to extend its influence, secure its borders and mute the opposition, particularly the Kurdish opposition. Indeed, Trump's second term in office has changed American policy in a direction favorable to Turkish interests. The US decision to withdraw US troops from Syria and reduce support for the Syrian Kurdish militias has indeed brought Washington's position closer to that of Ankara. This change of course weakened the Turkish-Kurdish opposition, allowing Türkiye to advance its agenda more firmly. Coupled with the PKK's recent announcement of its self-dissolution, Türkiye is now in an ideal position to seize these geopolitical changes, aimed at strengthening both its internal stability and its regional influence in a turbulent Middle East. For its part, Israel has amply seized on , the aforementioned global geostrategic restructurings, to launch an all-out offensive against the constellation of pro-Iranian Shiite militias stretching from Lebanon to Yemen and regimes obsessed with Israel's destruction and fiercely opposed to any normalization. Since the events of October 7, 2023, there has been a war of attrition and position between the armed wings of Iran and Israel that has resulted in a weakening of these arms, the elimination of the main civilian and military senior staff and leaders and collateral civilian damage, including an unprecedented disastrous humanitarian situation. The so-called 'axis of resistance', in particular Hezbollah, has seen its credibility eroded as its true nature has been revealed: an instrument in the service of Tehran's regional ambitions rather than a genuine resistance movement. Its unwavering support for the Syrian Assad's regime, its support for the Polisario militias, its involvement in the Yemeni conflict via the Houthis against Saudi Arabia, which are destabilizing the entire sub-region and threatening navigation in the Bab Al Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, have gradually dispelled the myth of a disinterested struggle against Israel, laying bare its carefully orchestrated strategy of Shiite expansionism. Taking advantage of this growing discredit, Israel has initiated since the events of October 2023 a major reconfiguration of its strategic posture by deploying a military doctrine that combines targeted killings, offensive cyber operations and preemptive strikes against Iranian infrastructure in Syria and Iran. By invoking the famous formula attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte but also to the nineteenth-century diplomat Talleyrand, ' You can do anything with bayonets, except sit on them' reminds us of an eternal truth that directly challenges the current Israeli strategy. I firmly believe that Israel's military action on the ground is no substitute for a lasting political solution, a Peace of the Brave; strictly security and military approach, alone is unable of resolving a deep-rooted conflict. This underlines, in turn, the urgency of relaunching the peace process, by reviving the spirit of the Oslo Agreements and returning to the negotiating table through reliable mediators on the basis of a two-state solution, the State of Israel and a viable Palestinian state within the June 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem (Al-Quds) as its capital, living side by side. A dispersed Arab-Muslim world in the face of regional restructurings in the MENA region? International positions in the face of the ongoing war between Israel and Iran in June 2025 reveal a deeply fragmented diplomatic landscape, a veritable kaleidoscope. While Arab countries – especially the GCC, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq – denounce the Israeli strikes and call for immediate de-escalation – some such as Oman and Qatar are trying to mediate. Turkey strongly condemns Israel, calling it a dangerous escalation under Western complacency. For their part, Russia and China are publicly worried about the spiral of war, while positioning themselves as potential mediators. Other countries affirm their solidarity without going any further, as is the case of Algeria and Pakistan, which has closed its borders fearing a mass exodus if the regime ever collapses. Several Arab and OIC countries prefer to wait and see and express their positions within the multilateral framework, which was a godsend for countries that did not want to take clear-cut positions and prefer to remain in the comfort zone. The G7, despite internal tensions, particularly between the Europeans and the Trump administration, has shown a line of support for Israel's right to defend itself while calling for avoiding a regional conflagration. The European Union, for its part, insists on the diplomatic path and the resumption of nuclear dialogue with Tehran. This diversity of reactions illustrates both the geopolitical fault lines and the rivalries for influence that structure the new regional order in the Middle East. Indeed, since October 7, 2023, Middle Eastern countries have adopted diverse positions in the face of deep regional turbulence, guided by survival strategies adapted to the new geopolitical realities. Within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), there is a marked fragmentation: while Oman and Qatar play the traditional role of mediators, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pivoted from the use of hard power to regional de-escalation and the adoption of more pragmatic and soft strategies skilfully combining soft balancing and hedging to protect their interests in an uncertain context (membership of the BRICS, reception with great pomp of US President Donald Trump and rapprochement of ASEAN and China during the ASEAN-China GCC Trilateral Summit on May 27th in Kuala Lumpur, etc.). Morocco, for its part, pursues a skillful and pragmatic posture of hedging, combining multi-alignment, support for the Palestinian cause through a smart power approach that combines diplomatic firmness and action on the ground for the benefit of the populations via the Bit Mal Al Quds Agency and regional integration with African countries, particularly Atlantic countries and the countries of the Sahel. In another register, Algeria practices an ambiguous free-rider policy without any long-term strategic vision by displaying an anti-Western posture out of step with the reality of its opportunistic behavior while strengthening its ties with radical countries such as Iran, Venezuela and South Africa and supporting separatist movements around the world. Türkiye skillfully combines buckpassing and hedging, taking advantage of the vacuum left by Russia, the fall of the Syrian regime and the partial withdrawal of US forces to counter PKK that it considers a major security threat. Egypt maintains a mediating role in a posture combining buckpassing and soft balancing, while Iran pursues a clear strategy of hard balancing, consolidating its 'axis of resistance' against Israel and the Western powers. This kaleidoscope of various strategic postures demonstrates, if need be, a retreat of a common and unified policy among the Arab and Muslim countries, contrary to the coordination noticed during the October 1973 war. Since June 14, 2025, the events seem to mark the launch of a final assault on the citadel of Shiism and the 'resistance front', with the implicit objective of the lasting weakening of Iranian power and the prevention of any acquisition of nuclear weapons. Without giving in to the temptation of political fiction, it should be remembered that beyond confrontation, any war ultimately aims at a return to the negotiating table but from a position of strength. From this perspective, Iran's neighbours, including Israel, have a vested interest in seeing the emergence of a stable, less expansionist and more predictable state. The rational option would be not to plunge the country into chaos, but to gradually weaken the hard-line wing of the regime by promoting a controlled change from within in favor of the moderate wing. Some scenarios even evoke the possibility of a return to an enlightened monarchy, a hybrid formula, combining spiritual and temporal authority, distinct from the secular regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi. Such a development would make it possible to preserve national unity while opening the way to a more peaceful regional geopolitical reconfiguration. What is the decrypting of the Iran-Israel conflict? As old as humanity, war is a complex phenomenon, rooted in a multitude of intertwined factors. The genesis of armed conflicts eludes any unequivocal explanation insofar as they are the product of a complex interaction between systemic structural logics, political calculations and biased perceptions. The systemic and holistic approach to international crises and conflicts privileges systemic factors much more than the strategy of individual actors, the geopolitical changes in the MENA region are indeed the product of a change in the balance of the international system. The other reading grid is indeed the decoding of the strategies of the different actors, in this respect the most plausible explanations of the recent events in the Middle East are the theory of linkage politics (James Rosenau 1969); which articulates internal dynamics and external strategies, and the diversionist theory of war (Levy, 1989) ;which posits that certain leaders, faced with a decline in their legitimacy or a crisis of governance, trigger or stoke external conflicts to divert attention from internal unrest. This strategy, often used in authoritarian regimes, seeks to provoke a 'rallying around the flag', by brandishing nationalism or the foreign threat to stifle opposition. The personal risks incurred by autocratic leaders in the event of a loss of power – prison, exile, etc., contrast sharply with the 'peaceful retirement' offered to democratic leaders, influencing their propensity to resort to war. These strategies of diversion and export of the internal crisis to the outside world show that war is not only the result of geostrategic issues, but also of the logic of political survival. War becomes an extension of domestic politics by other means, according to a logic reversed to Clausewitz's formula. History is full of eloquent examples: in 1982, the Argentine junta launched the Falklands/Malvinas War to divert attention from a double serious economic crisis and growing international isolation, which allowed Margaret Thatcher to seize this opportunity to restore her image and muzzle the Labour opposition (Hzaine El Hassane, study under the direction of A OUALI for the benefit of the House of Representatives, 1983). Similarly, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) was triggered as both regimes faced internal tensions: Shia-majority Iraq feared the contagion effect of Iran's Islamic Revolution, while Iranian authorities used the conflict to consolidate their hold by marginalizing secular and nationalist factions and Arb Ahwaz region. The case of Syria offers an illustration of the logic of linkage politics, which articulates internal dynamics and external strategies (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East Syria Between Domestic and External Conflict, 1961-1970 Hebrew University, 1983). The Assad dynasty, particularly under Hafez, is said to have made systematic use of the conflict with Israel, particularly around the Golan Heights, to strengthen its domestic legitimacy (a predominantly Sunni Arab country dominated by a Shiite elite). Each rise in tension with Israel or involvement in regional wars (such as in Lebanon or in support of Hezbollah) made it possible to revive the rhetoric of 'resistance' and to occupy the domestic political space, while justifying repression under the guise of national unity. The hostility toward Israel acted as an outlet for the lack of political reforms and a locked economy. In the Maghreb, the most eloquent example is that of the military oligarchy in Algeria that emerged from the FLN, which uses the long-standing rivalry and animosity with Morocco – focused on memories of the sand war and the 'Hogra' – as a diversionary to mobilize popular support and muzzle the opposition and recently the Hirak. Each time civil protest reached its peak, the regime redoubled its nationalist rhetoric, portraying its neighbor as a threat to Algerian sovereignty. This strategy has helped to set aside demands for reform, keeping the military elites firmly in power. Post-revolutionary Iran has also institutionalized the use of foreign policy as a tool for internal cohesion. The Islamic Republic, facing structural challenges – sanctions, youth disaffection, internal power struggles – has steadily intensified its regional activism (in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria support for Hamas) to consolidate the power of the Revolutionary Guards and maintain an ideological narrative based on resistance to Israel and the West. This regional bellicosity, particularly through support for pro-Iranian militias, has served to divert popular demands, while allowing factions of the regime to strengthen their weight in the state apparatus (Shah Alam, Interplay of Domestic Politics and Foreign-Security Policy of Iran, 2016). Israel, for its part, is no exception to this logic and this dialectic between internal instability and offensive foreign policy. Indeed, in the 1980s, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, decided by the government of Menachem Begin and led by General Ariel Sharon, was as much a response to security calculations as to a context of internal political pressure. More recently, military campaigns against Gaza (notably in 2009, 2012, 2014 2021 and 2023) have often coincided with periods of political tension or election campaigns or political struggle. In 2023-2024, as the country is shaken by a deep institutional crisis around judicial reform, Prime Minister Netanyahu is relying on the security agenda to maintain his coalition, accentuating regional tensions and adopting a posture of extreme firmness vis-à-vis Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran. In June 2025, the weakened, divided and parliamentary deadlock in the B Netanyahu government saw the strike on Iran's nuclear facilities as a way to reunite public opinion and neutralize criticism. In contrast, an Iran going through a post-Khamenei transition, torn between conservative and reformist factions, has responded and seized this opportunity with a regional escalation – either directly or via its proxies – to project an image of unity and revive the revolutionary discourse that hides a crisis of legitimacy of an elite worn out by power. This situation reminds us of Henry Kissinger's famous formula in the 1970s: 'Israel has no foreign policy, only a domestic policy.' With this remark, Kissinger criticized Israel's tendency to subordinate its strategic choices to the imperatives of domestic politics (coalition games, partisan pressures, electoral stakes) to the detriment of a coherent and stable geopolitical vision. Without fully adhering to Henry Kissinger's famous phrase, I believe that it is clear that Israeli foreign policy has certainly always been influenced by domestic dynamics, however, this pattern has been partially shaken up by the arrival of the Trump administration, whose America First doctrine has redefined the terms of strategic engagement between the two countries. While Benjamin Netanyahu has been able to take advantage of his strategic proximity to the United States, notably through major advances such as the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Israel or the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israeli foreign policy remains closely aligned with Washington's agenda. Behind an apparent diplomatic autonomy, it is indeed a form of strategic alignment (bandwagoning) that has been consolidated, with Israel inserting itself willy-nilly into the geopolitical architecture of the White House. In a context of systemic rivalry with China, the US has regained the initiative by trying to lock down areas of instability that could offer Beijing room for maneuver. In this context, the recent confrontations between India and Pakistan in May 2025, as well as the escalation between Israel and Iran, carry major geostrategic impacts for China. The Indo-Pakistan conflict is jeopardising the stability of a key logistics node in the Belt and Road Initiative, while rising tensions with Tehran threaten Beijing's energy supplies, as Iran is one of its main oil suppliers. These sources of crisis, although peripheral to China, indirectly strengthen the bargaining power of the United States, which now has new levers to exert targeted pressure and negotiate advantageous compromises on the world chessboard.
