
Today, only Ukraine and Russia are ready for land war. We must change that
Ukraine's struggle against Russia has not fundamentally changed the principles of war. But when it comes to how we fight and how we prosecute violence on the battlefield, it most certainly has.
The requirements for success are the same in general terms. We need actionable intelligence on enemy dispositions and intentions, the ability to strike and defeat the enemy, and the ability to hold ground. This latter and most important element still requires soldiers. The trench warfare today in the Donbas is no different to the trench warfare at Ypres in 1915. Necessity is the mother of innovation on today's battlefield as much as it was during WWI, and trained manpower is still essential to develop and exploit any sort of success.
For most casual observers on the war in Ukraine, it is the drone which has changed the nature of conflict, but I suggest that is a false assumption. It is the changing way drones are used, not their inherent characteristics which have changed the fight. My last post in the British Army was in an intelligence role to help bring the Watchkeeper drone into service. This was a multi-million-pound surveillance platform. If you lose one such vehicle, you lose a huge amount of your capability. Today for the same price you can buy 10,000 drones off the shelf which can do much the same job. You can lose quite large numbers of these and your fighting capability is barely affected.
What is key today is the electromagnetic spectrum – he who controls this, controls the battle space. This means that fighting is not now about men and women being robust and able to shoot straight: there is an increasing role for the gamer and the hacker to affect the outcome of the battle from a 'room in-the-rear'. Most of the soldiers killed in today's war are killed by drones, potentially operated by someone far off: most of the drones, however, are relatively short ranging, meaning that the drone which kills a soldier probably took off from somewhere not that far away. There is thus still a need for tough, brave troops able to operate close to the enemy lines.
At the beginning of the war, we were training the Ukrainian army how to fight, but it is now them who are showing us the way to operate on the contemporary battlefield and I hope we are listening. We must also acknowledge, with the evolution of technology accelerating at such a pace, that where possible, we must buy drones etc off-the-shelf, modified if required. If we try to produce everything ourselves it will be well out of date well before it hits the front. Where we have the advantage, as perhaps in laser anti-drone technology, we should lead, but for most other capabilities we should follow our allies.
The much-discussed Strategic Defence Review is about to hit the streets with the plans for the British military over the next decade or so. With the current pace of change, it is no small wonder it is delayed and shrouded in secrecy. The team producing it are no doubt nervous about backing the wrong horse, tank or drone. The old saw 'there is nothing new, just stuff we forgot' has some resonance here. What has certainly not changed is the general principles of war, or as General Bill Slim put it 'hit the other fellow as fast as you can, as hard as you can, when he ain't looking and where it hurts him most'.
The principles of war have not changed at all, but the pace of innovation and technology has never been faster. Agility and flexibility are key. Well trained, motivated and well led soldiers are still essential, but control of the electromagnetic spectrum is the single most significant element for the successful prosecution of violence on the battlefield today and likely into the future.
The Review must produce a fighting force fit for the current and future battlefield – not the 'status quo ante' which Reviews have been wont to do in the past.

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


Telegraph
2 hours ago
- Telegraph
The best outcome from the Iran conflict? Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan
Two major conflicts – Ukraine and Iran – are creating seismic upheaval in the tightly meshed world of post-Cold War alliances around the world. The biggest losers in this lethal game of musical chairs will likely be smaller nations who can no longer rely on the protection and patronage of greater powers whose priorities have been radically realigned. The immediate result is a panicked race to seek new partners, a desperate rush of diplomatic blind dating in which those newly exposed smaller countries have very few cards to play other than to make painful concessions. This week's meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia – the first ever official bi-lateral visit between the heads of these two countries is a case in point. Armenia has for decades turned its back on two of its immediate neighbours – Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan, with closed frontiers and no diplomatic relations. That has only been possible because of Yerevan's ability to depend on two other major regional powers – Iran to the south and Russia to the north. Those alliances created a confidence which translated into a fatal overreach when Armenia, three decades ago, invaded Azerbaijan and occupied a fifth of the Azerbaijani territory of Karabakh, forcibly expelling some 800,000 Azerbaijanis and establishing a mono-ethnic Armenian state. For a generation, Azerbaijan's attempts to regain its territory through negotiation and diplomacy, despite resounding support for their sovereign rights over Karabakh from the UN Security Council, came to nothing. Russia, the former colonial power, could always be relied on to preserve the frozen conflict in ways which maintained Moscow's grip on its 'near abroad'. Then came 2020. In that year cross-border tit for tat between the two neighbours became a full-blown 44-day conflict, with Azerbaijan liberating much of Armenian-occupied territory. In 2023 what was not returned three years earlier was finally secured by Azerbaijan. To Yerevan's utter dismay, in both 2020 and 2023 its long-standing patron and formal military ally in the Kremlin was nowhere to be seen. Russia's Western imperial ambitions had exhausted its ability to maintain its old role of Caucasian puppet master to the south. Armenia was left to sink or swim. Azerbaijan's combat victories, cemented with a ceasefire but still today without a peace treaty, can be read as definitive proof that Russia had left the stage as far as Armenia was concerned. That might have led Pashinyan to seek urgent reconciliation with Turkey. Instead, Yerevan doubled down on its relationship with its one remaining regional protector, Iran. Arguably he had no option: decades of virulent anti-Turkish domestic and international rhetoric would probably have made any pro-Ankara realignment fatal to his own government at that point. And why risk alienating your one remaining powerful friend, Iran, by reaching out to its long-standing opponent Turkey? Just as the Ukraine war provoked one crisis for Armenia, the Iran war has provoked a second. But this time Iran's troubles and dramatically exposed weakness, with the Islamic Republic itself now friendless in a world where its ally Assad has fallen and the leverage of its proxy Houthi, Hezbollah and Hamas militias has been decimated, have left Yerevan not with one but with zero dependable allies. Even Armenia's ability to call on its once powerful diaspora lobby groups in the US and France is no longer a realistic strategy in today's climate, given the deeply problematic Iran connection. This is the sequence of events which has left Armenia with literally nowhere to turn but Ankara. Pashinyan, an intelligent politician who has shown some ability to negotiate within the desperately narrow space afforded by the tensions of geopolitical reality and domestic nationalist opinion, will need every ounce of skill to emerge from the current talks with a result which has both substance and domestic credibility. For now, concessions – if he is wise to take them – are his best card. Turkey will not contemplate normalisation of still less supportive friendship with Armenia unless Yerevan formally commits to a peace deal with Azerbaijan. The country's President Ilham Aliyev has long maintained such a peace deal needs to entail a rewriting of the Armenian constitution to remove extra-territorial claims on Azerbaijan's internationally recognised sovereign territory, the establishment of a formal right to return of Azerbaijanis expelled from Armenia during the break-up of the Soviet Union, and agreement on a land corridor through Armenia (would earn huge income) enabling Azerbaijan and countries from Asia the swiftest land route to Europe. Some in Armenia will see these as too painful to concede. Wiser heads will see them for what they are: economic and diplomatic opportunities to move forward after over three decades of conflict. If Pashinyan can take this unpalatable medicine – and if by some miracle he can sell it to his electorate, Armenia stands to benefit. A chance of establishing new partnerships with more reliable neighbours, the enormous benefits of regional economic and energy integration after decades of impoverished isolation, a chance in fact for normalisation, peace and prosperity. The alternative is too foolhardy to contemplate.


The Guardian
3 hours ago
- The Guardian
British man arrested for alleged terrorism offence and spying on RAF base in Cyprus
A British man has been arrested on suspicion of espionage and terrorism offences in Cyprus. He allegedly surveilled the RAF Akrotiri base on the island and is suspected of having links with Iran's Revolutionary Guards, local media reported. RAF Akrotiri is the UK's most important airbase for operations in the Middle East. The Philenews website said the man was arrested on Friday after intelligence he was planning an imminent terrorist attack. The man appeared before a district court on Saturday, which ordered he be detained for eight days pending inquiries, Reuters reported. Police told the news agency they would not be releasing further details, citing national security. He is alleged to have lived in a flat in Zakai, Limassol, close to Akrotiri, and was observed near the base carrying a camera with a long lens and three mobile phones. The suspect is also alleged to have had the Cyprus's Andreas Papandreou airbase, in the western region of Paphos, under surveillance since mid-April, the country's ANT1 news portal reported. Local reports suggested he was Azerbaijani but the UK Foreign Office said they were working with the authorities over the arrest of a Briton. A Foreign Office spokesperson said: 'We are in contact with the authorities in Cyprus regarding the arrest of a British man.'


The Independent
3 hours ago
- The Independent
Iran warns US involvement in Israeli attacks would be ‘very dangerous'
US involvement in attacks on Iran would be 'very, very dangerous', Tehran's foreign minister has warned as Donald Trump continues to mull over whether to support Israeli strikes. Abbas Araghchi British, French and German counterparts. Donald Trump's sabre-rattling over potential strikes on Iran came to a head earlier this week when he said he 'may' authorise an attack, before later setting himself a two-week deadline to make the decision. In the strongest suggestion yet that Trump is prepared to authorise strikes in the near future, The Times reports that American B-2 stealth bombers have moved from their base in Missouri and are bound for a military base in the Indian Ocean. These are the warplanes which can deliver the US military's advanced 'bunker busting' bombs, capable of striking the Iranian nuclear targets buried deep underground. With an apparent two-week grace period before US strikes, Tehran has the chance to push for further nuclear negotiations with Washington, which came to a halt when Israeli strikes last week sparked a deadly air conflict which has killed hundreds in Iran and dozens in Israel. But Iran 'cannot' join further nuclear negotiations with the US while the Iranian people are 'under bombardment', Mr Araghchi said on Saturday, adding that Tehran stands 'absolutely ready for a negotiated solution for our nuclear programme'. American military involvement "would be very unfortunate', Mr Araghchi said. At least 430 people have been killed in Iran already since the conflict began last Friday, when Israel issued a wave of strikes across Iranian nuclear sites and on the capital city of Tehran. In Israel, 24 people have been killed by Iran's retaliatory strikes, including in Tel Aviv. Israel says it has killed dozens of Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists linked to Tehran's nuclear programme and its powerful Revolutionary Guard Corps. On Saturday, the IDF said it had killed two commanders of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who it claimed were closely linked with arming Hamas and other militant groups in the region. One of the commanders, Saeed Izadi, led the Palestine Corps of the overseas arm, or Quds Force, foreign minister Israel Katz said in a statement. He has been described as a veteran figure in Iran's military operations. The Quds Force built up a network of Arab allies known as the Axis of Resistance, establishing Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 and supporting the Palestinian militant Islamist group Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The military later said that it killed a second commander of the Guards' overseas arm. The commander of the Quds Force's Weapons Transfer Unit (Unit 190) in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Behnam Shahriyari, was killed by the Israeli air force in an overnight strike against his vehicle, the IDF said. Shahriyari "worked for years to arm various terrorist organisations in order to directly advance the Iranian regime's plan to destroy the State of Israel', the IDF claimed. Israel itself suffered no overnight casualties on Saturday, after a significantly lower level of Iranian attacks involved only five missiles, down from 23 the day before. The IRGC is yet to confirm the deaths.