Man who faked Biden bribery story to stay in prison
A federal judge has denied the US government's request to release a jailed former FBI informant who made up a story about president Joe Biden and his son Hunter accepting bribes, which became central to Republicans' impeachment effort.
The decision, issued on Wednesday by US District Judge Otis Wright in Los Angeles, comes weeks after a new prosecutor reassigned to Alexander Smirnov's case jointly filed a motion with his lawyers asking for his release while he appeals his conviction.
In the motion, the US government had said it would review its "theory of the case".
In his written order, the judge said Smirnov was still a flight risk, even if prosecutors said they would review his case.
"The fact remains that Smirnov has been convicted and sentenced to 72 months in prison, providing ample incentive to flee," he said.
Smirnov, 44, was sentenced in January after pleading guilty to tax evasion and lying to the FBI about the phoney bribery scheme, which was described by the previous prosecutors assigned to the case as an effort to influence the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.
His lawyers, David Chesnoff and Richard Schonfeld, told The Associated Press in a text they would appeal the judge's decision and "continue to advocate for Smirnov's release".
Smirnov had been originally prosecuted by former Justice Department special counsel David Weiss, who resigned in January days before President Donald Trump returned to the White House for his second term.
Smirnov has been in custody since February 2024.
He was arrested at the Las Vegas airport after returning to the US from overseas.
The dual US and Israeli citizen falsely claimed to his FBI handler that about 2015, executives from the Ukrainian energy company Burisma had paid then-vice president Biden and his son $US5 million ($A8 million) apiece.
The explosive claim in 2020 came after Smirnov expressed "bias" about Biden as a presidential candidate, according to prosecutors at the time.
In reality, investigators found Smirnov had only routine business dealings with Burisma starting in 2017 - after Biden's term as vice-president.
Authorities said Smirnov's false claim "set off a firestorm in Congress" when it resurfaced years later as part of the House impeachment inquiry into Biden, who won the presidency over Trump in 2020.
The Biden administration dismissed the impeachment effort as a "stunt".
Weiss also brought gun and tax charges against Hunter Biden, who was supposed to be sentenced in December after being convicted at a trial in the gun case and pleading guilty to tax charges.
But he was pardoned by his father, who said he believed "raw politics has infected this process and it led to a miscarriage of justice".
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