The Sudanese Economy: Between the Devastation of War and the Myth of Production
The Sudanese Economy: Between the Devastation of War and the Myth of Production
Omer Sidahmed
April 2025
Email: [email protected]
'Sudan's agricultural production during the war has surpassed production levels in years of peace' – A statement attributed to the Minister of Finance in the de facto government, Jibril Ibrahim, and publishedby 'Al Arabiya Sudan' on April 24, 2025, has sparked widespread controversy. As the war enters its third year, Sudan is living through one of the worst chapters in its history: economic devastation and the collapse of essential services. The reality on the ground refutes these claims.
Jibril Ibrahim is not merely an acting finance minister; he is a militia leader, a prominent Islamist figure, and a longtime ally of the National Congress Party, which ruled Sudan for three decades with authoritarianism and corruption before being overthrown by the December Revolution. Today, he is reviving the same old project: a kidnapped state, plundered resources, and political propaganda disconnected from reality.
**Agriculture in Sudan has never been merely an economic sector; it is the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population. Today, however, it is besieged by war:**
– Most agricultural production areas are located within active military operation zones.
– Fuel, fertilizer, seeds, and financing are absent.
– Farmers have been displaced, or their projects have halted due to lack of security.
– There is no official data or field reporting to support government statements.
Who, then, is planting and harvesting in a country where villages are bombed and supply lines are cut?
According to the general manager of one of the major banks, the percentage of bad debts in Sudan has reached 50%. The banking system, already fragile, has grown even weaker due to the war and the swelling of the parallel economy, with 95% of the cash supply existing outside the banks. There is no banking capacity to finance agricultural or industrial production, which exposes the claims of economic growth as baseless.
Sudan's current economy is managed by a network of alliances among remnants of the National Congress Party and military militias. There is no budget, no accountability, and no transparency:
– Gold is smuggled through parallel airports.
– Revenues are spent outside the official budget framework.
– Resources are allocated to fund the war.
– Institutions are used to suppress revolutionaries and the revolution.
– More than 13 million children are in urgent need of support (UNICEF).
– 70% of health facilities are destroyed or out of service (World Health Organization, 2024).
– Electricity and water are unavailable in vast parts of the country.
– More than 20 million people are suffering from hunger and food insecurity (World Food Programme, 2024).
– GDP has contracted by 18% (World Bank, 2023).
– 60% of industrial activity has ceased.
– Poverty levels have exceeded 65%.
– Agricultural exports have declined significantly.
This statement is not a slip of the tongue, but rather an attempt to falsify reality and justify the war. Sudan needs to dismantle the war economy and build a peace-driven economy under a transparent civilian state that serves its citizens, not misleads them.
References
– Statement by Jibril Ibrahim, 'Al Arabiya Sudan', April 24, 2025.
– World Bank: Sudan Economic Monitor, 2023.
– World Health Organization: Sudan Report, 2024.
– UNICEF: Sudan Education Emergency Report, 2024.
– World Food Programme: WFP Sudan Emergency Update, 2024.
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The true challenge is not waiting for war to end, but using the fractures it created to fuel civil resistance and spark new beginnings — toward a democratic, civilian, just, and salvaging state that reflects the people's aspirations, not the interests of entrenched elites. References 1. 1. Global Witness (2019). 'The Ones Left Behind: Sudan's Secret Gold Empire.' 2. 2. International Crisis Group (2022). 'The Militarization of Sudan's Economy.' 3. 3. Human Rights Watch (2020). 'Entrenched Impunity: Gold Mining and the Darfur Conflict.' 4. 4. United Nations Panel of Experts on the Sudan (2020–2023). Reports to the Security Council. 5. 5. BBC Arabic & Al Jazeera Investigations (2021–2023). Coverage of Sudan's illicit trade and media operations. 6. 6. Radio Dabanga (2015–2023). Reports on drug trafficking and corruption during Al-Ingaz regime. 7. 7. Sudan Tribune (2020). 'Forex crisis and informal currency trading in Sudan.'
