China's dying EV batteries, solar cells are powering a circular economy in new-energy era
One man's waste is Ma Long's treasure.
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And in the new-energy era, his map leads to exhausted lithium-ion batteries – veritable troves of reusable resources that are supercharging profits at Ma's company, a maker of solid-waste-recycling equipment in central China.
Pricey components such as lithium – a silvery-white alkali metal aptly nicknamed 'white gold' – along with other materials such as cobalt and nickel, hold their value beyond the life of the batteries powering China's massive electric-vehicle (EV) industry.
'There is huge potential in the business of new-energy waste, because new energy is where China and the world are going,' said the sales manager at a subsidiary of Henan Hairui Intelligent Technology in Zhengzhou, Henan province.
Speaking at a recent trade fair for environmental technologies in Shanghai, Ma said 70 per cent of his company's business is dedicated to machines for recycling batteries and solar panels.
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As more and more batteries and solar panels reach the end of their life cycle in China – a global leader in renewable-energy deployment – Chinese businesses like Ma's are embracing a circular economy, where materials are reused and reintroduced into new products, reducing waste and conserving resources.
And with valuable metals comprising essential components in many of today's fast-growing, clean-energy technologies, the cycle is especially meaningful in terms of improving China's mineral independence as it navigates intensifying global trade tensions, according to some analysts.
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Asia Times
9 hours ago
- Asia Times
China's industrial policy has an unprofitability problem
Analyzing American economic policy isn't that interesting these days, except perhaps as a grim spectacle. So I've been thinking a little about Chinese economic policy. China's leaders leave much to be desired, but to their credit, they still think economic policy is about strengthening their nation, enriching their people and improving their technology instead of pursuing domestic culture wars by other means. Anyway, China has a lot of policy initiatives right now — cleaning up the fallout from the real estate bust, retaliating against America's tariffs, improving their health care system, and so on. But their most important policy — and the one everyone talks about here in the US — is their big industrial policy push. If you want to understand Chinese industrial policy, I recommend starting with Barry Naughton's free book, 'The Rise of China's Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020.' The basic story is that until the mid-to-late 2000s, China didn't have a national industrial policy as such. It had a bunch of local governments trying to build up specific industries, usually by attracting investment from multinational companies. And it had a central government that tried to make it easy for local governments to do that, using macro policies like making sure coal was cheap, holding down the value of the Chinese currency in order to stimulate exports and so on. But it was not until the end of Hu Jintao's term in office — and really, not until Xi Jinping came to power — that China developed a national industrial policy, in which the government tries to promote specific industries using tools like subsidies and cheap bank loans. If you want a good primer on just how big those loans and subsidies are, and which industries they're going to, I recommend CSIS' 2022 report, 'Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective.' It's a lot. Here are the authors' estimates from 2019: Source: CSIS In some respects, this policy was successful. For example, it moved China up the value chain — instead of doing simple low-value assembly for foreign manufacturers as in the 2000s, China in the 2010s learned to make many of the higher-value components that go into things like computers, phones and cars, as well as many of the tools that create those goods. This had the added security benefit of making China less dependent on foreign rivals for key manufacturing inputs. China has doubled down on its centralized, big-spending industrial policy since then. In 2021-22, China suffered a huge real estate bust, crippling a sector that had accounted for almost one-third of the country's GDP. China's leaders responded by doubling down on manufacturing, encouraging banks — essentially all of which are either state-owned or state-controlled — to shift their lending from real estate to industry. In 2023, you saw charts like this: Source: Shanghai Macro via Bert Hofman Along with this industrial policy, you saw a massive surge of Chinese-manufactured exports flowing out to the rest of the world. The most recent export surge has been labeled the 'Second China Shock', but in fact, the trend was already headed in that direction well before the pandemic: Source: CSIS China's competitive success in manufacturing industry after industry has been nothing short of spectacular. In just a couple of years, China went from a footnote in the global car industry to the world's leading auto exporter: Source: Visual Capitalist Obviously, this export surge is the most important way that people in countries like the US experience the results of China's industrial policy. So most commentary on the policy has focused on exports, trade balances and so on. But it's important to remember that most of what China is producing in this epic manufacturing surge is not being exported. For example, take cars. Even though China is now the world's top car exporter, most of the cars it makes are sold within China: Source: Brad Setser China's auto industry is actually unusually domestically focused, compared to other auto powerhouses like Germany, South Korea, and Japan: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion In fact, this pattern holds across the whole economy. For an industrialized country, China is unusually insular — its exports as a percent of its GDP are higher than the US, but much lower than France, the UK, Germany, or South Korea: Source: World Bank Most of China's enormous manufacturing subsidies are not actually for export manufacturing; they're for domestic manufacturing. The rest of the world is just getting a little bit of spillover from whatever Chinese companies can't manage to sell domestically — except for a country as huge as China, a 'little spillover' can seem like a massive flood to everyone else. And here lies the rub. Essentially, China is huge and most of its trading partners are pretty small. There's a limited amount of Chinese cars, semiconductors, electronics, robots, machine tools, ships, solar panels, and batteries they can buy. And on top of that, some of China's biggest trading partners are levying tariffs against it. For most Chinese manufacturers, export markets are simply not going to replace the domestic market. And this means that Chinese manufacturers will be forced to compete against each other for a domestic market whose size is relatively fixed, at least in the short term. That competition will eat away at their profit margins. In fact, this is already happening. Vicious price wars have broken out in the Chinese auto industry, and even the country's top carmakers are under extreme pressure: Chinese carmakers' price war is putting the industry's balance sheet under strain…Current liabilities exceeded current assets at more than a third of publicly listed car manufacturers at the end of last year…China's leading carmakers are being forced to…fight for market share amid heavy [price] discounting… The dominant electric-vehicle maker BYD is deepest in negative territory with its working capital, followed by rivals Geely, Nio, Seres and state-backed BAIC and JAC, while the total net current assets of 16 major listed Chinese carmakers [saw] a 62 per cent decline from…the first half of 2021… 'Given the current downward trend, China's auto industry is expected to enter an industry-wide elimination phase . . . in 2026 at the latest,' [an analyst] warned. 'During the process, some companies will die of liquidity crises.'… BYD recently came under pressure to defend its financial numbers and business practices after Wei Jianjun, chair of rival Great Wall Motor, called for a comprehensive audit of all major domestic carmakers…'An Evergrande exists in [China's] auto sector at the moment — it just hasn't blown up,' he told local media, raising the spectre of the industry following the property sector into a spiralling debt crisis. How can these mighty world-conquering automakers be skating on the edge of bankruptcy when the government is pouring so many subsidies and cheap loans into the auto industry? The answer is simple: China's government is paying its car companies to compete each other to death. The Chinese government pays a ton of different car companies to make more cars. Chinese banks, at the government's behest, give cheap loans to a bunch of different car companies to make more cars. So they all make more cars — more than Chinese consumers want to buy. So they try to sell some of the extra cars overseas, but foreigners only buy a modest amount of them. Now what? Unsold cars pile up, prices are cut and cut again, and all the car companies — even the best ones, like BYD — see their profit margins fall and fall. It's not just autos, either — similar things are happening in solar, steel, and a bunch of other industries. Manufacturing profit margins are plunging across China's entire economy: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion A Chinese buzzword for this sort of excessive competition is 'involution.' Why is this bad, though? Who cares about profit, anyway? After all, China's workers are getting jobs, and China's consumers are getting a ton of cheap cars and other manufactured stuff. So what if rich BYD shareholders and corporate executives take a loss? Well, in fact, there are several problems. The first is macroeconomic. Price wars across much of the economy create deflation. In fact, China is already experiencing deflation: China's consumer prices fell for a fourth consecutive month in May…with price wars in the auto sector adding to downward pressure…The consumer price index fell 0.1% from a year earlier…CPI slipped into negative territory in February, falling 0.7% from a year ago, and has continued to post year-on-year declines of 0.1% in March, April, and now May…Separately, deflation in the country's factory-gate or producer prices deepened, falling 3.3% from a year earlier in May[.] A lot of this is probably due to weak demand from the ongoing real estate bust, but price wars prompted by industrial policy will make it worse. Deflation will exacerbate the lingering problems from the real estate implosion. Debts are in nominal terms, meaning that when prices go down, those debts become harder to service. More of the debts go bad, and banks get weaker — all those bad loans on their books make them less willing to make new loans. Consumer debts get more onerous too, making consumers less willing to spend (and consumers, unlike banks, are not government-controlled). This effect is called debt deflation. On top of that, a massive wave of bankruptcies could cause a second bad-debt crisis on top of the one that's already happening from real estate. Wei Jianjun of Great Wall Motor has been warning of exactly this happening. In fact, we can already see Chinese banks beginning to slow the torrid pace of industrial loans they were dishing out a couple of years ago: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion All of this could extend China's growth slowdown for years. There are also microeconomic dangers from overcompetition. Competition could spur Chinese companies to just innovate harder. But if China's top manufacturers are constantly skating on the edge of bankruptcy, that means they'll have fewer resources to invest in long-term projects like technological innovation and new business models. Basically, prices are signals about what to build, and China's industrial policies are sending strong signals of 'build more stuff today' instead of 'build better stuff tomorrow.' There's also the danger that China's government won't allow the price wars to end. Ideally, you'd want these price wars to be temporary; eventually, you'd want weak producers to fail, allowing top producers to increase their profitability. This good outcome relies on the government eventually cutting subsidies and letting bad companies die. But letting bad companies die means a bunch of people get laid off. Bloomberg recently had a good report about the political pressures on the Chinese government to keep the subsidies flowing: Local leaders laden in debt are rolling out tax breaks and subsidies for companies, in a bid to stave off the double whammy of job and revenue losses…For China's top leaders, employment is an even more politically sensitive issue than economic growth, according to Neil Thomas, a fellow for Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis…Already there are signs the weakening labor market is becoming a touchy subject: One of China's largest online recruitment platforms Zhaopin Ltd. this year quietly stopped providing wage data it's compiled for at least a decade. Already, Bloomberg reports that economic protests are proliferating across the country; with the real estate crisis ongoing, the government will be under even more political pressure to keep manufacturing employment strong. This could mean keeping crappy companies on life support. These so-called 'zombie' companies, kept alive only by a never-ending flood of cheap credit, were a big part of why Japan's economy slowed down so much in the 1990s. So this is the scenario where China's industrial policy ends up backfiring. Subsidies and cheap bank loans dished out to high-quality and low-quality companies alike could flood the market with undesired product, spurring vicious cutthroat price wars, destroying profit margins, exacerbating deflation, and generally making the macroeconomic situation worse. And then China's government could double down by trying to protect employment, by never halting subsidies for companies that fail. Usually, when we think of the costs of industrial policy, the main thing we think about is waste, and there is certainly plenty of waste in China's current approach. But China's experience is illuminating a second problem with industrial policy — the risk of vicious price wars and deflation due to the subsidization of too many competing companies. This article was first published on Noah Smith's Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion subscriber here.
HKFP
a day ago
- HKFP
EU bans Chinese firms from major state medical equipment contracts
The European Union on Friday banned Chinese firms from government medical device purchases worth more than five million euros (US$5.8 million) in retaliation for limits Beijing places on access to its own market. The latest salvo in trade tensions between the 27-nation bloc and China covers a wide range of healthcare supplies, from surgical masks to X-ray machines, that represent a market worth 150 billion euros in the EU. 'Our aim with these measures is to level the playing field for EU businesses,' the bloc's trade commissioner Maros Sefcovic said. 'We remain committed to dialogue with China to resolve these issues.' In response, China accused the EU of 'double standards'. 'The EU has always boasted that it is the most open market in the world, but in reality, it has gradually moved towards protectionism', foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said at a regular press briefing. 'Under the guise of fair competition (the EU) actually carries out unfair competition, which is a typical case of double standards.' The European Commission said in a statement the move was in 'response to China's longstanding exclusion of EU-made medical devices from Chinese government contracts.' Brussels said just under 90 percent of public procurement contracts for medical devices in China 'were subject to exclusionary and discriminatory measures' against EU firms. In addition to barring Chinese firms from major state purchases, 'inputs from China for successful bids' would also be limited to 50 percent, it said. Over the last three years, Brussels and Beijing have come into conflict in a number of economic sectors, including electric cars, the rail industry, solar panels and wind turbines. The decision on medical devices comes at a time of heightened trade tensions with President Donald Trump's United States, which has imposed customs surcharges on imports from all over the world, including Europe. The EU has decided to take a tougher stance on trade in recent years, adopting a vast arsenal of legislation to better defend its businesses against unfair competition. In April 2024, the commission opened an investigation into Chinese public contracts for medical devices, the first under a new mechanism introduced by the EU in 2022 to obtain better access to overseas state purchases. China, on the other hand, accuses Europe of protectionism. After a year of negotiations, the commission, which manages trade policy on behalf of the 27 member states, said it had failed to make any progress with China. 'The measure seeks to incentivise China to cease its discrimination against EU firms and EU-made medical devices and treat EU companies with the same openness as the EU does with Chinese companies and products,' Brussels said.
Asia Times
a day ago
- Asia Times
Chinese state-owned airlines join price war in national mission
Chinese state-owned airlines have joined an intensifying price war, although unwillingly, amid challenges including local passengers' weakening spending power and rising market competition. Air China, Southern Airlines and Eastern Airlines have been facing huge losses for five years since the Covid-19 pandemic broke out in early 2020. Although China canceled all epidemic rules in early 2023, the three firms still recorded net losses in the past two years. They carried more passengers last year than in 2023, but had to lower air ticket prices due to rising competition from budget airlines and China State Railway Group, the country's high-speed train operator. The price war is intensifying this year. Many Chinese airlines now offer domestic round-trip tickets at about 200 to 300 yuan (US$28 to US$42), as it is a low season before the summer holidays. Round-trip tickets to remote cities are 80- 90% off, while those to key cities like Beijing are 40-50% off. Budget airlines such as Spring Airlines and Juneyao Air are growing fast in this price war. a unit of the People's Daily, reported in late May that Chinese airlines have started offering significant discounts to customers. For example, a ticket for a round trip between Chengdu and Kunming costs only 222 yuan, and between Chengdu and Haikou, it costs 237 yuan. Kunming and Haikou are famous for their natural attractions. A Chongqing-based writer said air tickets departing from Chengdu are about 70% off on average from the high season. He said a Beijing-Sanya round trip ticket is only 230 yuan, down from 2,000 yuan during the Spring Festival in late January. He said the competition intensifies as Chinese airlines keep opening new routes this year. Citing Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) data, Xinhua reported in March that 38 airlines will open 640 new domestic flight routes this year, connecting key cities such as Chongqing, Changsha and Tianjin with tourism cities in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. The CAAC also allowed 193 local and foreign airlines to add 22,946 new international passenger and cargo flights per week in 2025, or 33% more than in the same period last year. These new routes cover 78 foreign countries, 57 along the Belt and Road. 'Do you think the three state-owned airlines don't want to make a profit?' a Shandong-based columnist called Xiao Song says in an article. 'They have their difficulties.' 'Despite losing money, some routes had to be launched for political reasons, such as those to Xinjiang and Tibet, and those to African and South American countries,' he said. He added that budget airlines and state-owned airlines operate their businesses differently. For example: Spring Airlines targets low-cost tourists who travel to remote cities, while state-owned airlines mainly compete in key cities. Juneyao Airlines offers one-day trips for businesspeople at prices lower than those of the high-speed railway. Budget airlines mainly use Airbus A320, which can fly up to 12 hours per day, compared with state-owned airlines' 10 hours. State-owned airlines deploy domestically some of their long-range Boeing 787 planes, which burn more fuel than narrow-body aircraft. State-owned airlines operate less efficiently than private firms. He said these are reasons why budget airlines can make a profit and pay their pilots 15,000 yuan per 90 flight hours, while state-owned airlines lose money and can only offer their pilots 10,000 yuan. He said state-owned airlines now realize these problems and try to provide more low-cost packages. In 2024, the top seven Chinese airlines, including state-owned and private ones, recorded combined revenues of 587 billion yuan, up 13.6%. Spring Airlines was the most profitable, with a net profit of 2.27 billion yuan. In fact, Air China, Eastern Airlines, and Southern Airlines successfully narrowed their net or before-tax losses last year from 2023. The number of passengers carried was 155 million (+23.8%) for Air China, 141 million (+21.6%) for Eastern Airlines, and 165 million (+16%) for Southern Airlines. According to the CAAC, the total number of flight passengers grew 5.8% to 246.8 million in the first four months of 2025 compared with last year. Currently, the central government does not intend to stop the price war or reduce competition in the airline industry. 'The decline in air ticket prices is good news for the tourism market as it can effectively boost the number of tourists and create growth for related industries such as hotels, catering, transportation and retail,' a Yunnan-based writer says in an article. She thinks the trend will also help diversify the tourism market, as new and small tourism sites can emerge. However, Hsieh Chin-ho, a Taiwanese commentator, said the falling prices of air tickets and hotels will worsen China's deflationary problem, which was caused by the burst of the country's property bubbles several years ago. Hsieh said China's consumer price index (CPI) decreased by 0.1% year-on-year in May, and its producer price index (PPI) dropped by 3.3% year-on-year, showing weak domestic consumption. He said a vicious cycle created by weakening consumption and falling property prices could further drag down the Chinese economy – resulting in a lost decade of slow or negative GDP growth, such as was experienced by Japan from the 1990s to the 2010s. Read: China's fast-growing high-speed railway network faces reality
