The Danger Of Trump's Imminent Israeli-Iran War Involvement
As Israeli fighter jets bomb suspected Iranian military facilities and covert assassination campaigns target Iranian military leaders and scientists, the United States finds itself being pulled deeper into a conflict it outwardly aims to avoid. While Washington claims it is not at war with Iran, the facts on the ground indicate that there is U.S. involvement in Iran. American weapons, intelligence systems, and diplomatic cover are directly supporting Israeli military actions—turning what started as an Israeli campaign into a war with clear American involvement. Even more concerning, President Trump has indicated he will decide whether to directly enter the war within two weeks. Meanwhile, a significant amount of American naval support is heading towards the conflict zone.
Although Israeli officials present these attacks as defensive responses to an imminent nuclear threat, the parallel to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq is hard to ignore. Back then, as now, secretive intelligence and speculation about weapons of mass destruction form the basis of preemptive war. Similarly, calls for restraint are overshadowed by a chorus of urgency, veiled threats, and regional power struggles. But unlike Iraq, this time the U.S. is not just involved in initiating the war; it is backing a conflict that could engulf the region and potentially entangle America as well.
Furthermore, President Trump is even contemplating an attack on the leader of Iran. Although not formalized in a binding treaty, there is a widely respected informal norm urging world leaders to avoid assassinating one another. Ultimately, respect for state sovereignty is at stake. And that principle is increasingly being breached in major global conflicts today.
While Israel justifies its strikes on Iran by claiming that Tehran is getting closer to developing nuclear weapons, a narrative echoed in Washington and widely repeated in the Western press, official assessments present a more complicated picture. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at the start of this conflict Iran was not actively working on a nuclear bomb, and the IAEA had not found conclusive proof of a renewed weapons program. Although Iran's 'breakout time'—the period needed to produce enough highly enriched uranium for one bomb—has significantly decreased, this does not mean Iran is actually creating and deploying a nuclear weapon. That process requires not only fissile material but also sophisticated warhead design, dependable delivery systems, and rigorous testing—all of which remain unconfirmed in Iran's case.
It seems, therefore, that the idea Iran is on the verge of going nuclear is not based on verified intelligence but on political urgency and worst-case assumptions. These fears, whether real or exaggerated, are fueling a military response that could easily escalate into a full-scale regional war and beyond.
The irony of this story is hard to overlook. Israel is widely recognised to possess a strong and undeclared nuclear arsenal, estimated at 80 to 90 warheads, with fissile material for several hundred more. These figures come from reputable sources including the Nuclear Threat Initiative and SIPRI. Yet Israel has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is not subject to IAEA inspections, and faces no international sanctions for its nuclear stance. Meanwhile, Iran—while a signatory to the NPT—is persistently scrutinised for enrichment activities still legally permitted under international law, while Israel's nuclear opacity enjoys the full protection of its American ally.
Israel's recent campaigns in Gaza have resulted in staggering human costs. The United Nations estimates that more than 35,000 civilians were killed during the latest offensive, with entire neighbourhoods, hospitals, and infrastructure obliterated. Human Rights Watch has documented and daily television news reports on multiple channels from Gaza repeatedly confirm Israeli strikes on non-military targets, raising serious concerns about proportionality and the laws of armed conflict.
Now, similar Israeli tactics are being applied elsewhere across borders. In Syria, Lebanon, and increasingly within Iran itself, Israeli strikes are targeting scientific centres, residential areas, and transport hubs. Civilians have been killed in cities like Beirut, Isfahan, and Tehran. What once seemed like a regional containment policy now shows the traits of a broader, irreverent deterrence doctrine—enabled by unconditional U.S. support.
To claim that the U.S. is merely a passive observer is both inaccurate and misleading. American-provided munitions, joint military efforts, satellite and signals intelligence, and diplomatic support at the United Nations have all played a vital role in Israel's operational capabilities. This backing occurs despite the lack of clear congressional approval or public debate to clearly define American interests in the conflict. It also happens without any attempt to establish a long-term strategic goal. There is no diplomatic plan. No red lines for escalation have been set. And there is no accountability for what appears to be Israeli overreach.
President Trump's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018—originally intended to delay Iran's weapons capability—marked a turning point. The subsequent 'maximum pressure' campaign failed to restrict Iran and instead caused increased enrichment, regional instability, and now the risk of outright war. It is a failure of both diplomacy and deterrence, yet the same approach is being followed again.
Iran has not attacked the United States. Although it funds groups hostile to U.S. allies, this has been its stance for decades and does not justify war under international law or the U.S. Constitution. No resolution from the United Nations authorizes force against Iran. No direct threat has been demonstrated to justify preemptive self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
If the aim is to prevent a nuclear Iran, diplomacy—despite being challenging—is the only feasible option. Bombing Iranian facilities is likely to speed up Tehran's nuclear pursuits rather than stop them. It could also boost support for the most hardline factions of the Iranian regime domestically and might provoke asymmetric retaliation against U.S. interests throughout the Middle East.
While the United States escalates its military involvement in the Middle East, it has started to withdraw from another conflict it is both legally and morally obliged to address. In 1994, through the Budapest Memorandum, the United States assured Ukraine's sovereignty in return for Kyiv relinquishing the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal.
That commitment was already strained by Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the initial onset of Russia's hostilities towards Ukraine. Trump did nothing to address this escalating war during his first term from 2017 to 2021. While Trump supporters argue that, unlike Obama, Trump supplied Ukraine with Javelin missiles, the key word is 'supplied.' In reality, he sold them to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the war became existential in 2022 when Moscow launched a full-scale invasion. Now, in 2025, Trump's support for Ukraine is waning. Aid packages are delayed or reduced. Political rhetoric shifts towards 'peace through disengagement.' Ukraine, it appears, has become a bygone cause. In short, the US is willing to bankroll another war against a hypothetical nuclear Iran but hesitant to fully honour a promise to defend a non-nuclear Ukraine, especially since Ukraine chose disarmament. The message to other nations is clear: nuclear restraint leads to American abandonment.
The United States does not need to engage in conflict with Iran. Nor should it endorse a deterrence model that depends on regional devastation and global hypocrisy. If Washington aims to preserve its credibility as a world leader, it must uphold world peace everywhere—not selectively, as with U.S. actions in Iran. This requires a renewed commitment to diplomacy with adversaries, enforcing norms among allies, and prioritizing conflicts where its reputation—and honour—are already at stake. Ukraine qualifies as such a conflict. Iran does not.
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