No rules, no rulers: The unraveling of the old world order and the role of Russia
The day is not far off when the very notion of 'international order' will lose its former meaning – just as happened with the once-theoretical concept of 'multipolarity.' Originally conceived in the mid-20th century as a way to balance power among great states, multipolarity now bears little resemblance to what its originators had in mind. The same is increasingly true of international order.
In recent years, it has become commonplace to say that the global balance of power is shifting and that previous leaders are no longer able to maintain their dominant positions. This much is obvious. No group of states today is capable of enforcing its vision of justice or order upon the rest of the world. Traditional international institutions are weakening, and their functions are being re-evaluated or hollowed out. Western Europe, once a central pillar of global diplomacy, appears to be in the final phase of its strategic decline – a region now better known for procedure than power.
But before we join the chorus, lamenting or celebrating the end of one era and the start of another, it is worth asking: what exactly is 'international order'? Too often, this concept is treated as a given, when in fact it has always been a tool – one used primarily by states with both the means and the will to coerce others into accepting certain rules of the game.
Historically, 'international order' has been imposed by dominant powers capable of enforcing it. But today, emerging players outside the Western sphere – nations like China and India – may not be particularly interested in taking up that role. Why should they invest their resources in a vague, abstract idea that primarily served the interests of others?
The second traditional purpose of international order has been to prevent revolutionary upheaval. In the current strategic environment, this function is largely fulfilled not by institutions or diplomacy but by the simple fact of mutual nuclear deterrence. The handful of states with major nuclear capabilities – Russia, the United States, China, and a few others – are enough to keep general war at bay. No other powers are capable of truly challenging them in an existential way. For better or worse, that is what guarantees relative global stability.
It is therefore naive to expect new great powers to be enthusiastic participants in building a new international order in the traditional sense. All past orders, including the current UN-centered one, emerged from intra-Western conflicts. Russia, while not a Western country in the cultural or institutional sense, played a decisive role in those conflicts – especially the Second World War – and was central to the global architecture that followed.
In fact, one could argue that the current international order, such as it is, was a product of Russia's intervention in a Western civil war. It's no coincidence that at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Tsar Alexander I behaved not as one of many European leaders, but as a figure set apart – an 'arbiter of Europe.' Russia has always seen itself this way: too large, too sovereign, and too independent to be just another node in someone else's system.
This is a key distinction. For Russia, participation in international order has never been an end in itself, but a means to preserve its own unique position in world affairs. That is something it has pursued with remarkable persistence for over two centuries.
As for today's great powers – China, India, and others – it is far from clear that they view 'international order' as an instrument of survival or control. For many, the phrase remains a Western invention, a theoretical construct that served to legitimize power imbalances under the guise of shared rules.
At the same time, the concept retains appeal for many medium-sized states, especially those in the so-called Global Majority. For them, international law and the UN system – however flawed – offer a semblance of protection from the arbitrary power of the strongest. Despite their limitations, these institutions give smaller countries a seat at the table, a platform from which to bargain, and sometimes a shield against the worst abuses of power.
But even this minimal order is under strain. Its legitimacy was once based on mutual recognition by the powers capable of upending it. Today, however, former leaders are losing their grip, and no new actors are rushing to take their place. Without legitimacy or coercive backing, the very idea of a shared order becomes difficult to sustain.
That leads us to a paradox: we may be entering a world in which the West's vision of international order is no longer accepted or relevant – yet no one is particularly eager to replace it with something new. What we may see instead is a gradual emergence of equilibrium, a new arrangement that scholars might label a 'new international order,' though in practice it will have little in common with the frameworks of the past.
In sum, the category of 'international order' may soon follow 'multipolarity' into conceptual obscurity. It will be talked about, invoked in speeches, and cited in academic papers – but it will no longer describe how the world truly works.
We are moving into an age where power is distributed differently, where the mechanisms of control are less formalized, and where legitimacy is negotiated in real time rather than bestowed by inherited institutions. In such a world, stability will not depend on abstract rules or formal alliances, but on the raw calculations of capable states – above all, those that have the resources and resilience to shape events rather than be shaped by them.This article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club, translated and edited by the RT team.
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