
Free Speech Does Not Mean Hurting Sentiments of Others: Justice V Ramasubramanian
Hyderabad: 'Free speech does not mean hurting the sentiments of others,' remarked Justice V. Ramasubramanian, Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and former judge of the Supreme Court of India, while addressing a national seminar on Judiciary as the Guardian of Human Rights: An In - Depth Evaluation on Tuesday.
Justice Ramasubramanian emphasized the delicate balance courts must maintain when constitutional freedoms come into conflict. 'When two rights compete, the courts must apply extreme caution. In such cases, Article 18 helps determine which right prevails,' he noted.
India is not an easy country to govern, he said, highlighting the judiciary's role since Independence and classifying its contributions into four key areas. The first, he said, is facilitating access to justice. 'Facilitating access to justice for the common man is the first step,' he said.
Expanding the Scope of Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and liberty, has evolved to include the right to livelihood, dignity, and freedom of movement. The third important contribution, he noted, is uplifting Directive Principles. He explained that the judiciary has interpreted the Directive Principles of State Policy as enforceable by aligning them with Article 21, thereby giving them constitutional strength.
The fourth core contribution, he said, is creating laws where none exist. He praised the courts' proactive role in establishing temporary legal frameworks - such as gender sensitization committees for women - in the absence of formal legislation.
Justice Dr Shameem Akhtar, Judge of the Telangana High Court, remarked, 'No system is perfect, but ours is evolving towards a more just and compassionate society.'
Dr Vidyadhar Bhatt C., Secretary and CEO of the Telangana State Human Rights Commission (TSHRC), stated that in a democratic country, the judiciary is the guardian of human rights.
The seminar concluded with a consensus that the judiciary remains the most trusted and consistent guardian of human rights in India.
The event was attended by senior members of the bar, law students, civil society representatives, and members of the media.
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