Sulzer opens Swiss hub to boost biopolymer innovation
Sulzer opened its fourth location in Switzerland. The Innovation Technology Hub (InTecH) in Winterthur Töss will further enhance Sulzer's research and development capabilities in advanced polymer processing and recycling. With 3,150 m2 of laboratory and research space, this strategic investment is part of the company's ongoing commitment to sustainable innovation.
With the growing global population consuming more products and services, the amount of plastic used for packaging, electronics or construction has steadily increased. Traditionally, these plastics are made from fossil sources. Biopolymers such as PLA (Polylactic Acid) and PCL (Polycaprolactone) can be produced from renewable sources, are designed for biodegradability and have a much lower carbon footprint. They contribute to solving two major environmental challenges: carbon emissions and plastic waste.
Sulzer has opened its fourth Swiss site, InTecH, in Winterthur Tí¶ss to boost R&D in advanced polymer processing and biopolymer recycling. The 3,150 m² hub will support prototype production and smart material development. It strengthens Sulzer's global innovation network and commitment to sustainable, circular plastic solutions.
Leading biopolymer technology
Sulzer is the leading technology and critical equipment supplier for the production of PLA, the most important bioplastic used today. The company's leading technology is used at most PLA plants, playing a key role in projects such as India's first sugarcane-to-bioplastic facility, large-scale PLA production in China and the world's largest PLA production facility, currently under construction in the United Arab Emirates. With the new facility in Switzerland, Sulzer continues to invest in the growing biopolymer market.
Suzanne Thoma, Executive Chairwoman of Sulzer, said: 'After the opening of our innovation technology hub in Singapore in March last year, the new site in Switzerland will further accelerate the development and deployment of new biopolymers. It demonstrates our ongoing commitment to overcoming our customers' challenges and fulfilling our mission of serving essential industries and contributing to a prosperous economy and sustainable society.'
Pilot plants, laboratory, testing units
Together with Sulzer experts, customers will finetune their product offerings for the needs of targeted end-markets. InTecH is equipped with film, molding, foam and extrusion lines, enabling biopolymers to be shaped with precision to meet specific customer requirements such as durability, flexibility and biodegradability. Thanks to the equipment provided, prototype production is possible on a scale ranging from kilograms to a few tons.
Tim Schulten, President of Sulzer's Chemtech division , said: 'We are looking forward to supporting our customers in developing smart materials and circular business models. This hub is all about customized solutions – whether it's purifying materials, producing sustainable foams from recycled materials or developing biobased plastic solutions. Our team is ready to tackle the biggest challenges in polymer processing and sustainability.'
Sulzer's innovation and technology hubs have a strategic global footprint, with sites in the US, Asia and Europe, each built around specialized expertise. The hubs are equipped with everything innovative companies need to transform next-generation technology from theory to reality – from battery and plastic recycling, sustainable aviation fuels, biopolymers, carbon capture utility and storage, among others. Note: The headline, insights, and image of this press release may have been refined by the Fibre2Fashion staff; the rest of the content remains unchanged.
Fibre2Fashion News Desk (MS)
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