Iran issues stark warning to Trump 'the gambler': We will end this war

U.S. President Donald Trump walks to board Marine One to depart from the White House en route to New Jersey, in Washington, D.C., U.S., June 20, 2025. (Reuters

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South China Morning Post

an hour ago

• South China Morning Post

Have Trump's Iran strikes given China a strategic advantage?

The US' direct engagement in the Israel-Iran conflict over the weekend could intensify its drive to secure critical resources – particularly rare earth minerals – a development that could strengthen China's position in its ongoing geopolitical and economic rivalry with Washington, analysts said. A potential escalatory spiral in the Middle East could push forward trade negotiations between the world's two largest economies, said Xu Weijun, an assistant research fellow at South China University of Technology's Institute of Public Policy. 'An intensifying situation would force the US to allocate more strategic resources there, leaving fewer resources available for competition with China in the Indo-Pacific, thereby easing pressure,' he said. 'On the other hand, one key focus of trade talks is rare earths, which are critical to modern technology and defence industries – and arguably a strategic vulnerability for the United States. As tensions escalate in the Middle East, Washington's urgency to secure these resources is likely to grow, giving Beijing more leverage at the negotiating table.' US President Donald Trump said on Saturday that the United States had conducted a 'very successful attack' on three nuclear sites in Iran. Tehran has pledged retaliation, and threatened to close the vital Strait of Hormuz. The strike has fuelled fears among various countries that tensions in the region will further intensify, and deepened Washington's military entanglements abroad at a time when its trade relationship with China remains stalled. China and the US remain locked in a tense stalemate over tariffs and other trade issues, with the most recent talks in London yielding little tangible progress.

Asia Times

2 hours ago

• Asia Times

How India should read and react to Trump

On June 21, 2025, US President Donald Trump once again claimed that he had brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan—saying he had 'stopped the war' while invoking Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan's Army Chief General Asim Munir, and lamenting that he still 'won't get a Nobel Peace Prize.' This marked the 15th time Trump has made such a claim. India's position, however, remains unequivocal: PM Modi, in a June 18 phone call with Trump, reaffirmed that India had never accepted third-party mediation and that the ceasefire was the result of 'direct military-to-military communication between the Directors General of Military Operations,' initiated by Pakistan. India's Ministry of External Affairs and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri echoed this, stressing that India ' has not accepted, and will never accept, mediation ,' and that there was no discussion of a trade-for-ceasefire linkage. Trump's repetition of this narrative underscores a pattern of diplomatic overreach, factual distortion, and personal grandstanding in critical international matters. India should now stop responding to every statement Trump makes regarding this claim. Although he holds the office of the US President, it is important to recognize that he is also an impulsive and transactional leader who has openly admitted, 'I myself don't know what I will do next.' Taking his remarks at face value only amplifies them and makes New Delhi appear reactive to a personality who thrives on attention, disruption, and strategic ambiguity. Recently, Trump hosted Pakistan's Army Chief, General Asim Munir, at the White House and praised what he called Pakistan's 'very, very strong leadership.' Earlier, US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla described Pakistan as a 'phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism world,' citing its role in intelligence-led operations against ISIS-K. However, Trump's current overtures toward Pakistan must be viewed through a geopolitical lens, particularly in the context of the ongoing Israel–Iran conflict. Following Israel's strikes on Iran, the region remains volatile, and Trump appears to be seeking Pakistan's support—or at least its neutrality—given its long border with Iran and its past role in hosting US military infrastructure. Analysts suggest that if the conflict escalates, Pakistan could serve as a potential logistical or strategic partner for the United States. This should not be interpreted as a deep strategic realignment with Pakistan. During his first term, Trump openly accused Islamabad of 'lies and deceit' and suspended nearly US$2 billion in military aid, citing its duplicity in the War on Terror. In a widely noted tweet, Trump said: 'The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools… They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan… No more! ' Trump knows Pakistan well. He understands that it has never been a reliable security partner—receiving US aid while simultaneously sheltering the very Taliban forces that American troops were fighting in Afghanistan. Given this history, it is unlikely that he has had a genuine change of heart. Pakistan, in turn, is playing to Trump's well-known desire for admiration—offering flattery and even passing a parliamentary resolution nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Trump's repeated claims of mediating between India and Pakistan are a misrepresentation of facts. Even if India continues to issue categorical denials, he is likely to repeat the same narrative. His pattern of exaggeration—claiming he could end the Russia–Ukraine war in 24 hours or bring lasting peace to the Middle East—underscores that India is dealing with a deeply unpredictable and performative figure. It Is time for India to stop responding to Trump's provocations and instead focus on the broader strategic trajectory of the India–US relationship. New Delhi should engage consistently with the broader US foreign policy establishment—including career officials in the State Department, Congress, leading think tanks, and the strategic community—that recognizes India as central to a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. Unlike the narrow, tactical US–Pakistan cooperation—mostly limited to military coordination between the Pentagon and Rawalpindi during crisis scenarios—the India–US partnership is broad-based, resilient, and multidimensional. It spans government-to-government, business-to-business, people-to-people, academic-to-academic, and civil society linkages. These diverse connections make the partnership stronger and more enduring. Even when one track faces challenges, others reinforce the foundation. Key initiatives like the US–India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), launched in January 2023 by the national security advisors of both countries, provide a structured framework for cooperation in AI, quantum technologies, semiconductors, space, and defense innovation. The INDUS-X initiative, launched in June 2023, accelerates collaboration between defense startups. Meanwhile, the TRUST framework (Technology Resilience and Underpinning Sectors of Trust), introduced in policy discourse in 2023–24, focuses on building secure supply chains and trusted technology ecosystems. The evolving COMPACT initiative (Comprehensive Partnership for Advanced and Critical Technologies) reflects a long-term vision for co-development and co-production in critical tech and energy. In essence, the India–US relationship touches nearly every facet of human interaction—from innovation to education, energy to health, security to sustainability. As Prime Minister Modi aptly stated during his 2023 US visit, 'no corner of human enterprise is untouched by the partnership between our two great countries, which spans the seas to the stars. ' It is anchored in shared democratic values, institutional trust, and strategic convergence. Unlike the instrumental and transactional US–Pakistan dynamic, India–US ties are part of a long-term strategic alignment, not subject to the whims of personalities or the volatility of immediate crises. Whenever the US reaches out to Pakistan, Indian public discourse often interprets it as a zero-sum game—where any engagement with Islamabad is viewed as a loss for India. This mindset reflects outdated 'hyphenation' thinking, which wrongly assumes that India and Pakistan occupy equivalent roles in global politics. In reality, the two countries hold vastly different positions: India is a rising global power, with a $3.7 trillion economy and the world's third-largest military, while Pakistan remains a struggling regional actor—economically constrained, strategically dependent, and possessing niche utility in specific security scenarios. Trump's latest attempt to equate the two should be seen as a tactical move to secure Pakistan's cooperation in a specific context—most notably the Israel–Iran crisis—rather than a meaningful change in the U.S. strategic outlook. As Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center has observed, 'This is likely a case of Trump being intrigued by the complexity and intractability of India–Pakistan relations and wanting to crack the code… but not necessarily reflecting US policy.' He further cautioned that the India–US relationship could suffer if it continues to be framed in Islamabad's shadow—a framing that Washington's broader strategic community has largely resisted. The appropriate response for New Delhi is not to react to every provocative statement, but to anchor the bilateral relationship in long-term shared interests—spanning strategic, technological, economic, academic, and civil-society domains. Washington's strategic elite understand this distinction. As Kugelman noted to Reuters, 'India is now a much closer US partner than Pakistan,' reflecting a solid alignment in Indo-Pacific strategy and global vision. India must clearly articulate its concerns to the US whenever military cooperation with Pakistan poses risks to its national security. Strategic clarity and proactive diplomatic engagement are essential. However, this must not translate into letting the broader India–US relationship be held hostage to Trump's unpredictable rhetoric. Instead, New Delhi should remain focused on strengthening cooperation across key domains—economic, technological, defense, academic, and civil society—regardless of momentary political noise. Trump should be seen for what he is: a transactional and often erratic actor, whose positions frequently shift based on political expediency or personal ego. The way forward for India is to deepen institutional engagement with enduring pillars of the US strategic community—Congress, the State Department, the Pentagon and influential think tanks. Let Trump say what he wants; the India–US partnership is anchored in long-term strategic convergence and shared democratic values—far too vital to be disrupted by one man's craving for attention. Dr Imran Khurshid is associate research fellow, International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi, and adjunct research fellow, The Peninsula Foundation

Asia Times

3 hours ago

• Asia Times

US strikes on Iran set a troubling illegal precedent

After the United States bombed Iran's three nuclear facilities on Sunday, US President Donald Trump said its objective was a 'stop to the nuclear threat posed by the world's number one state sponsor of terror.' US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth echoed this justification, saying: The president authorised a precision operation to neutralize the threats to our national interest posed by the Iranian nuclear program and the collective self-defence of our troops and our ally Israel. Is this a legitimate justification for a state to launch an attack on another? I believe, looking at the evidence, it is not. Under the UN Charter, there are two ways in which a state can lawfully use force against another state: the UN Security Council authorizes force in exceptional circumstances to restore or maintain international peace and security under Chapter 7 the right of self-defense when a state is attacked by another, as outlined in Article 51. On the first point, there was no UN Security Council authorisation for either Israel or the US to launch an attack on Iran to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council has long been concerned about Iran's nuclear program and adopted a series of resolutions related to it. However, none of those resolutions authorised the use of military force. With regard to self-defense, this right is activated if there is an armed attack against a nation. And there's no evidence of any recent Iranian attacks on the US. There have been incidents involving attacks on US assets by Iranian-backed proxy groups in the region, such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hezbollah. In his address to the nation on Saturday night, Trump made reference to historical incidents the US believes the Iranians were responsible for over the years. However, none of these actions is directly related to the strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. Another possible ground the US can use to mount a case for its bombardments is anticipatory or preemptive self-defense. Both of these aspects of self-defense are controversial. They have never been clearly endorsed by the UN Security Council or the International Court of Justice. The US has sought to assert a fairly wide-ranging, robust interpretation of the right of self-defense over many years, including both anticipatory self-defense and preemptive self-defense (which is particularly relevant in the Iran strikes). The major point of distinction between the two is whether a potential attack is imminent. Anticipatory self-defense is in response to an attack on the brink of happening, such as when armed forces are massing on a border. Preemptive self-defense is a step further removed, before a genuine threat materializes. Famously, in 2002, the administration of President George W Bush adopted what is known as the 'Bush doctrine' following the September 11 terrorist attacks. This doctrine was framed around the notion of preemptive self-defense justifying a strike on another nation. This was one of the grounds the US used to justify its military intervention of Iraq in 2003 – that Iraq's alleged program of weapons of mass destruction posed an imminent threat to the US. However, this justification was widely discredited when no evidence of these weapons was found. With regard to Iran's nuclear program, an imminent threat would require two things: Iran having nuclear weapons capability, and an intent to use them. On capability, there have been debates about Iran's transparency with respect to its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But, importantly, the IAEA is the body that has the authorization and capability to make judgments about a nation's nuclear program. And it said, at this point in time, Iran did not yet have nuclear weapons capability. As Rafael Grossi, the head of the IAEA told the BBC: […]whereas until the early 2000s there used to be […] a structured and systematic effort in the direction of a nuclear device, that is not the case now. Trump's statement in which he referred to the US military operation against Iran's 'nuclear enrichment facilities' was particularly striking. There was no reference to weapons. So, even the language coming out of the White House does not make reference to Iran possessing weapons at this point in time. Trump's address to the nation after the Iran strikes. Further, many states have nuclear weapons capability, but they're not necessarily showing intent to use them. Iran has a long track record of aggressive rhetoric against Israel and the US. But the critical question here is whether this equates to an intent to strike. Israel began its military campaign against Iran on June 13, also arguing for the need for anticipatory or preemptive self-defense to counter the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program. If Israel is exercising its right to self-defense consistently with the UN Charter, as it claims, it can legitimately call on the assistance of its allies to mount what is known as 'collective self-defense' against an attack. On all the available evidence, there's no doubt the Israelis and Americans coordinated with respect to the US strikes on June 22. At face value, this is a case of collective self-defense. But, importantly, this right is only valid under international law if the original Israeli right to self-defense is legitimate. And here, we encounter the same legal difficulties as we do with the US claim of self-defense. Israel's claim of an imminent attack from Iran is very dubious and contentious on the facts. The overarching concern is these strikes can set a precedent. Other states can use this interpretation of the right of self-defense to launch anticipatory or preemptive strikes against other nations any time they want. If this practice is allowed to go unchecked and is not subject to widespread condemnation, it can seen by the international community as an endorsement – that this type of conduct is legitimate. There are many states acquiring conventional weapons that could be seen to pose a potential threat to their neighbors or other states. And there are several states considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons. One example is Japan, where there has been some debate about nuclear weapons as a deterrence to future possible threats from China. So, how might Japan's actions be seen by its neighbors – namely China and North Korea? And how might these countries respond in light of the precedent that's been set by the US and Israel? Australia's Foreign Minister Penny Wong has come out in support for the US action, saying 'we cannot allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.' She hasn't, however, addressed the legality of the US strikes. The Albanese government should be discussing this. There's an expectation, in particular, on the part of Labor governments, given former leader Doc Evatt's role in the creation of the UN Charter, that they show strong support for the rules-based international order. Labor governments were very critical of the way in which the Howard government engaged in the US-led invasion of Iraq, asserting there was no basis for it under international law. Accordingly, there is an expectation that Labor governments should hold all states accountable for egregious breaches of international law. And, when viewed through the lens of international law, there's no other way you can characterize the US strikes on Iran. Donald Rothwell is professor of international law, Australian National University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.